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SEMANTICS AS JURISPRUDENCE: THE
ELEVATION OF FORM OYER SUBSTANCE




Marital settlement agreements are the vehicle by which the distri-
butional consequences of the overwhelming majority of divorces in this
country are concluded. Surprisingly, in virtually every state, marital set-
tlement agreements have given rise to a confusing, and sometimes im-
penetrable, body of case law. Partly responsible for this confusion is the
tension that exists between the movement toward greater freedom of
contract and the traditional public policy interest that states retain in
regulating some of the incidents of divorce. Like the great majority of
states, North Carolina domestic law was characterized for decades by
some degree of inconsistency and confusion Nevertheless, a conscien-
tious effort to analyze and integrate the major principles governing set-
tlement agreements could yield reliable conclusions. In this Article
Professor Sharp asserts that unfortunately this is no longer the case; sev-
eral developments within the past decade have reduced the law of mari-
tal settlement agreements to a conglomeration of irreconcilable,
confusing, and unworkable principles. The Article traces the origin of
these developments in the previous decade in order to demonstrate the
extent and consequences of the present state of confusion in the law gov-
erning settlement agreements. The Article focuses on the relationship
between settlement agreements and final divorce decrees, and upon the
effect of reconciliation of the parties on a settlement agreement. The
Article concludes that the law regarding marital settlement agreements
in North Carolina has produced results that are bewilderingly complex
and fundamentally unsound, and suggests corrective steps for judicial
and legislative consideration.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private ordering of the consequences of divorce has, for many years, re-
ceived virtually unanimous approval from commentators, practitioners, parties,
and the judiciary.1 Separation or marital settlement 2 agreements are, quite cor-
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Research for this project
was supported by a grant from the North Carolina Law Center. I would particularly like to thank
my research assistants, Joan Mitchell and Christine Wichers, for their tireless, meticulous, and su-
perb work in the completion of this Article.
1. See, e1g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Act § 306, 9A U.L.A. 216 (1987); H. CLARK,
THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNrrED STATEs 755 (2d ed. 1988); Mnookin & Korn-
hauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). But see
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rectly, said to minimize the psychological and economic costs of divorce, to cre-
ate better prospects for post-divorce cooperation between the parties, to lessen
the impact of divorce upon children, and to promote judicial economy. 3 It is
hardly surprising, therefore, to find that these agreements are the vehicle by
which the distributional consequences of the overwhelming majority of divorces
in this country are concluded. 4 What is surprising is that, in virtually every
state, marital settlement agreements have given rise to a body of case law that is
at best confusing, and at times nothing less than impenetrable.5 The conse-
quences of this confusion and complexity are serious indeed: property divisions
that, through a technicality or misused term of art, turn out to be modifiable
alimony, the lack of contempt as an enforcement remedy, the ease with which an
agreement may (or may not) be set aside, nonapplicability of res judicata stan-
dards, and confusion with regard to the effects of reconciliation.6
Part of this confusion derives from the simple fact that the law governing
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984) (the author accurately notes that a dispar-
ity of resources affects the settlement process no less than the litigation process).
2. The variation in the labels attached to such agreements is a forewarning of the confusion
that pervades much of this area of the law. Legislative and judicial attempts to distinguish among
consent judgments, property settlements, and separation agreements are more fully described in
Sharp, Divorce and the Third Party: Spousal Support, Private Agreements and the State, 59 N.C.L.
REv. 819 (1981). Professor Homer Clark continues to prefer the comprehensive use of the term
"separation agreement" to include any agreement "which settles whatever issues may arise in the
course of a divorce case, including those relating to alimony, to a division of property, to child
support and to child custody." H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 756. The term is also used in a compre-
hensive sense in the UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE AcT § 306, supra note I, at 216. For a variety
of reasons (notably tax and bankruptcy consequences) technical distinctions between "property set-
tlements" and "separation agreements" remain significant in many instances. Such distinctions in
the divorce context, however, in which child support may be a "trade-off" for alimony, or when a
property division may be structured as alimony, may be functionally meaningless. As Professor
Clark has noted, treating separation and property agreements "as giving rise to different kinds of
agreement obscures these relationships and produces no benefits of either clarity or efficiency." H.
CLARK, supra note 1, at 756 (footnote omitted). In an attempt to obviate this kind of confusion, one
commentator has suggested use of the term "divorce settlement agreement" to describe comprehen-
sive documents that deal with both support and property rights. See Brogan, Divorce Settlement
Agreements: The Problem of Merger or Incorporation and the Status of the Agreement in Relation to
the Decree, 67 NEB. L. REv. 235, 239 (1988). Because North Carolina courts have begun to draw
important, highly technical, although somewhat unrealistic, distinctions between "separation" and
"property" agreements, I am inclined to agree with Professor Brogan's suggestion that "divorce
settlement agreement" is a more comprehensive and less confusing term. For further discussion of
this issue, see infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
3. See H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 755; Sharp, Modification of Agreement-Based Custody De-
crees: Unitary or Dual Standard?, 68 VA. L. REv. 1263 (1982).
4. Professor Clark notes that ninety percent of all divorces are uncontested and estimates,
quite conservatively in my opinion, that well over fifty percent of these are disposed of by separation
agreements. H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 755. Others estimate that roughly ninety percent of all
divorces are concluded by agreement or default. Hansen, The Role and Rights of Children in Divorce
Actions, 6 . FAM. L. 1, 2 (1966).
5. This confusion reaches the level of bewilderment in some instances. The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals once candidly admitted that "[o]ur law is replete with interesting rules
which can be manipulated in such a way as to permit a court to arrive at any desired result." In re
Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 49 (W. Va. 1978). As this Article will attempt to demonstrate,
the same statement could be made with regard to this area of North Carolina law. See also Com-
ment, Divorce Agreements: Independent Contract or Incorporation in Decree, 20 U. Cam. L. REV.
138, 138 (1952) (The author points to the "flood of conflicting case law" in this area.).
6. See Brogan, supra note 2; see also infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (explaining
recent North Carolina developments in this area).
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marital settlement agreements is immensely complex. Much of that complexity
in turn derives from sources that are both historical and ideological. Both in
England and in the United States, "articles of separation" were the focus of
immense judicial hostility for much of the nineteenth and well into the twentieth
century.7 As the Supreme Court of North Carolina once noted with some dis-
taste, such agreements "if allowed, would virtually annul our marriage laws, and
make the relation of husband and wife a mere trade or bargain, dependent upon
their caprice." s
A rather begrudging judicial recognition of the validity of such agreements
was accompanied by the development of an ideological, and formidable, body of
public policy restrictions that was carefully designed to govern the execution
and to limit the substance of separation agreements.9 By at least the middle of
this century, however, most of these restrictions had begun to undergo a whole-
sale process of erosion. This was in part an accommodation to the realities of
modem divorce statistics and the increasing liberalization of divorce laws. 10 It
was also a response to the mounting demands from writers in this area for
greater freedom to contract." It is now the policy of almost all states that,
subject to judicial approval, parties may contract with regard to virtually all
7. For a more detailed discussion of the historical treatment of separation agreements, see
Sharp, supra note 2, at 827-29. For an excellent, and wholly entertaining discussion of the history of
such agreements in England, see Peaslee, Separation Agreements Under the English Law, 15 HAv.
L. REv. 638 (1902). At common law, of course, such agreements were wholly void: "By marriage,
the husband and wife are one person in law .... For this reason, a man cannot grant any thing to
his wife, or enter into covenant with her: ... for the grant would be to suppose her separate exist-
ence .... " 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
8. Collins v. Collins, 62 N.C. (Phil. Eq.) 113, 116 (1867).
9. The major public policy restrictions were that such agreements would be void if made "in
contemplation of divorce" (because this would tend to "encourage" divorce) or if they attempted to
alter the "essential elements" (that is, the duty of support) of marriage. Weitzman, Legal Regulation
of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1259 (1974). As noted in an earlier
article, such restrictions basically
centered on the state's interest in maintaining... the hierarchical relationship of the par-
ties to marriage, with the result that limitations on interspousal freedom to contract be-
came identified with perpetuation of inequality between the sexes. It therefore followed
that the movement toward greater equality between the sexes was accompanied by de-
mands for decreased state intervention in the regulation of marriage and divorce.
Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution on Contractual Freedom,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 1399, 1400-01 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
10. Sharp, supra note 9, at 1401-02; see also H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 756-57; 2 R. LEE,
NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 188, at 466-70 (4th ed. 1980). In 1985, the last year for which
complete statistics are available, there were approximately 1,190,000 divorces in the United States.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvs., VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 table 2-
3 (1985).
11. There has been a remarkably large number of academic voices raised in support of greater,
and sometimes unlimited, freedom to contract in this area. See, eg., L. WErrZMAN, THE MAR-
RIAGE CONTRACT 338 (1981); Klarman, Marital Agreements in Contemplation of Divorce, 10 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 397 (1977); Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Inef-
fective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558 (1974); Shultz, Contractual Ordering of
Marriage7 A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 204 (1982); Comment, Marriage as
Contract: Towards a Functional Redefinition of the Marital Status, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
607 (1973). The common theme underlying such articles echoes Sir Henry Maines's assertion that
the "movement of the progressive society has ... been a movement from Status to Contract." H.
MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (1970). For a more detailed critique of this freedom to contract posi-
tion, see Sharp, supra note 9, at 1401-05.
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issues 12 incident to divorce, so long as those agreements, or at least the process
by which they are concluded, are basically just and reasonable, and are largely
free from fraud, duress, undue influence, and other varieties of what Professor
Arthur Leff called "bargaining naughtiness."
1 3
Considerable tension remains, however, between the movement toward
greater freedom of contract and the traditional, and not unreasonable, public
policy interest that states retain in regulating some of the incidents of divorce.
Most frequently this state interest manifests itself in the form of some require-
ment that settlement agreements must be submitted to the court for judicial ap-
proval,1 4 and in the application of standards designed to ensure that agreements
are arrived at fairly or, less often, that their results are substantively fair.1 5
It is this tension-between treating settlement agreements as "'any other
12. Issues relating to children are, of course, excepted from the general rule. See Hudson v.
Hudson, 299 N.C. 465, 470, 263 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1980); Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 639, 133
S.E.2d 487,491 (1963); Story v. Story, 221 N.C. 114, 116, 19 S.E.2d 136, 137 (1942); 2 R. LEE, supra
note 10, § 189 (all stating strongly the proposition that parties may not, by agreement, withdraw
children from protection of the courts). See also H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 772 ("It is axiomatic
that the courts have an obligation in divorce litigation to place the highest importance upon the
welfare of the children of the marriage."). As a practical matter, however, courts rarely exercise
their inherent power to enter orders affecting children that differ from terms arrived at by agreement
between the parties. See I A. LINDEY & L. PARLEY, LINDEY ON SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND
ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 14.01-46-47 (1989); Sharp, supra note 3, at 1264; Wexler, Rethinking
the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 818-19 (1985).
13. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485,
539 (1967).
14. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr supra note 1, § 306(b) (the court must approve
agreements found to be not unconscionable); H. FOSTER, JR. & R. BROWN, CONTEMPORARY MAT-
RIMONIAL LAW ISsUES: A GUIDE TO DIVORCE ECONOMICS & PRACTICE 689-90 (1985). Most
states employ terms such as "fairness," "equity," "reasonable," or "not unconscionable" as the stan-
dard for judicial review. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.230(a)(2) (1983) (agreement must not be
"grossly unfair, unjust or inequitable"); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-317 (1976) (agreement is bind-
ing unless the court finds that it is unfair); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 14-10-112(2) (1987) (court must find
agreement is not unconscionable); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-66 (West 1986) (court must de-
termine if the agreement is "fair and equitable under all the circumstances"); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 572-22 (Supp. 1989) ("agreement shall be subject to approval by the court"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
40, para. 502(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (court must find agreement is not unconscionable); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-10(b) (Burns 1987) (court approval required before agreement will be incor-
porated into decree); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610b(3) (1983) (the court must find the agreement to
be "valid, just and equitable" before incorporation); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.180(2) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (court must find agreement is not unconscionable); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 208,
§ IA (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (court must approve the agreement or it becomes "null and void");
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.552(5) (West Supp. 1990) (court must make finding that the agreement is
"fair and equitable"); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.325(2) (1986) (agreement binding unless court finds it
unconscionable); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-201(2) (1989) (agreement binding unless court finds it
unconscionable); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-366(2) (1988) (agreement binding unless court finds it un-
conscionable); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(3) (McKinney 1986) (maintenance terms of agree-
ment must be "fair and reasonable" and "not unconscionable"); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.025(2)(b)
(1989) (court must find the agreement "to be just and equitable"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.09.070(3) (Supp. 1990) (contract must not be "unfair at the time of its execution"); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2-16(a) (1986) (court must find the agreement "fair and reasonable" and not obtained by
"unconscionable conduct"); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.255(11) (West 1981) ("no such agreement shall
be binding where the terms of the agreement are inequitable as to either party"). See also Sharp,
supra note 9, at 1408 n.37, for a discussion of how the confidential relationship between husband and
wife operates as a vehicle for imposing fairness in transactions between the spouses in several other
states.
15. See Sharp, supra note 9, at 1440-50, for a discussion of the distinction between procedural
and substantive fairness.
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bargained-for exchange between parties who are presumably on equal foot-
ing' "16 and treating them as special kinds of contracts, deserving of and requir-
ing "utmost concern" in the form of judicial scrutiny for unfairness or
overreaching' 7 -that has been partially responsible for the development of an
"irreconcilable" body of case law in this area.' s In addition, the requirement of
judicial review, without regard to whether such review is perfunctory or exact-
ing, has aided in the creation of what has aptly been described as "undoubtedly
the single most confused area of divorce procedure"19-the ultimate relation-
ship between the agreement and the subsequent decree. Stated differently, the
manner in which a final divorce decree treats the agreement of the parties usu-
ally will be the decisive factor in determining what provisions of the agreement,
if any, are subject to modification, what provisions are enforceable by contempt,
the applicability of res judicata standards, and the survival of any contract
rights.
20
Any attempt to summarize the great variation of principles in this area of
the law necessarily requires oversimplification. With that caveat in mind, it is
nonetheless possible to distinguish three major approaches regarding the rela-
tionship between agreements and decrees.2 1 The first, and the most simple, pos-
sibility is that the contract may be merged into the decree. Merger extinguishes
all contract rights and obligations, which then become part of the decree. Tech-
nical alimony provisions thus merged become subject to subsequent modification
and are enforceable by contempt. 22 The second, and by far the most confusing,
result occurs when the agreement is in some fashion "incorporated" into the
divorce decree, but retains its validity as a contract.2 3 This may result in the
16. Hill v. Hill, 94 N.C. App. 474,480, 380 S.E.2d 540, 545 (1989) (quoting Knight v. Knight,
76 N.C. App. 395, 398, 333 S.E.2d 331, 333 (1985)).
17. Johnson v. Johnson, 67 N.C. App. 250, 255, 313 S.E.2d 162, 165 (1984).
18. Brogan, supra note 2, at 242. Professor Brogan amply demonstrates this point by a detailed
discussion of the largely quixotic development of the law in this area in several states, notably Penn-
sylvania, West Virginia, Idaho, Arkansas, Missouri, and Montana. Id. at 249-63, 265-71.
19. I. ELLMAN, P. KURTZ, & A. STANTON, FAMILY LAW 730 (1986).
20. Custody and child support are modifiable in all states, either by specific statutory provisions
or by common law. See H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 724, 836; discussion supra at note 12. Property
divisions, on the other hand, are nonmodifiable. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. Thus,
the only real issues of modification involve payments labeled as alimony. For a general discussion of
other effects see Brogan, supra note 2.
21. Brogan, supra note 2, at 244; Sharp, supra note 2, at 849. Within these three major ap-
proaches, however, there are innumerable permutations. It appears, moreover, that it is rarely the
case that all three options exist within a single jurisdiction.
22. See Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal. 2d 55, 58, 265 P.2d 865, 866 (1954) ("Merger is the substitution
of rights and duties under the judgment or the decree for those under the agreement ...."); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 comment a (1982); H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 776;
Brogan, supra note 2, at 245; Sharp, supra note 2, at 849. It should be noted that it is only the
obligation to pay money that is technically merged, so that no independent action can be brought on
the underlying contractual obligation. RYSTrATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 450(1)(f) comment, at 537.
An order to convey property, on the other hand, is not merged into the decree. Id. It is nonetheless
enforceable, as an order of the court, by contempt, but the underlying obligation is not merged. H.
CLARK, supra note 1, at 777; Brogan, supra note 2, at 243 n.31. For a discussion of the distinction
between technical alimony and installment payments labeled "alimony," see infra notes 166-73 and
accompanying text.
23. Brogan, supra note 2, at 245; Sharp, supra note 2, at 849. The use of the very terms "incor-
porate" or "incorporate by reference" has given rise to massive confusion. In many states, "incorpo-
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
creation of a true hybrid contract and decree, the consequences of which vary
from state to state and consistently frustrate any attempt at explication. 24 Fi-
nally, the agreement may simply be presented to the court for its approval or
"ratification." 25 The ensuing decree does not set forth, incorporate, or merge
the terms of the agreement, which therefore retains its validity as a contract,
albeit one that has received a judicial imprimatur that it is fair and reasonable or
not unconscionable.
2 6
This brief summary, it must be emphasized, does not begin adequately to
describe the extent of the complexity or confusion that exists within the law of
most states. Despite the development of uniformity among the states with re-
spect to other areas of domestic law,27 the law of settlement agreements clearly
remains balkanized. To the degree that the function of the law of contracts and
of divorce is to provide certainty as to the rights and obligations of parties, the
law governing the relationship between decrees and agreements would appear to
frustrate that purpose at almost every turn. In almost equal measure, moreover,
the law controlling the operation and effect of settlement agreements prior to
entry of a divorce decree has also produced considerable inconsistency and con-
fusion, both with regard to the effect of a reconciliation between the parties, 28
and with the applicable standards that must be met if one party seeks to have the
agreement set aside or voided.
29
For decades the law of North Carolina more or less tracked the processes
ration" creates a "merger" result. See, eg., Levitch v. Levitch, 294 N.C. 437, 439-40, 241 S.E.2d
506, 507-08 (1978); H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 778; Comment, Divorce Agreements: Independent
Contract or Incorporation in Decree, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 138, 146 (1952). In others, it does not. See,
e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 467 A.2d 129, 132 (Del. Farn. Ct. 1983); Oehme v. Oehme, 10 Kan. App.
2d 73, 691 P.2d 1325, 1327 (1984); Mendelson v. Mendelson, 75 Md. App. 486, 498, 541 A.2d 1331,
1337 (1988). Professor Clark suggests that incorporation by reference, or any other option which
does not set forth the full text of the agreement, should not be deemed to create a merger. H.
CLARK, supra note 1, at 779. Lindey and Parley, on the other hand, suggest that an agreement may
be either incorporated and merged or incorporated but not merged. II A. LINDEY & L. PARLEY,
supra note 12, § 31.07 (Supp. 1989).
24. Brogan, supra note 2, at 245. The best attempt to explain this "incorporation without
merger" position is found in 1 VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY § 4.02, at
35-36 (J. McCahey ed. 1990). See also cases summarized in II A. LINDEY & L. PARLEY, supra note
12, § 28.05 (Supp. 1989) (discussing case law on this issue in various states); 2 R. LEE, supra note 10,
at 482-90 (discussing North Carolina law as it had developed prior to 1980).
25. 1 VALUATION AND DIsTmunuoN OF MARITAL PROPERTY, supra note 24, § 4.02, at 33-
36; Brogan, supra note 2, at 245; Sharp, supra note 2, at 849.
26. Sharp, supra note 2, at 849. Even somewhat perfunctory judicial approval may nonetheless
have significant res judicata effects. See, eg., Jones v. Jones, 140 So. 2d 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 146 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1962); Sasmore v. Mois, 154 A.2d 126 (D.C. 1959); Whitney v.
Heublein, 145 Conn. 154, 139 A.2d 605 (1958).
27. The previous two decades, of course, have been witness not only to the growing "constitu-
tionalization" of domestic law, but to the widespread adoption of numerous uniform acts. In addi-
tion, the federal government has recently begun to take a much more active role in issues involving
child custody and child support. The 1984 Child Support Enforcement Amendments to Title IV of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 654-67 (1988), the Family Support Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C.
§ 667 (1988), and the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A
(1988) are excellent examples of this growing federal involvement.
28. See H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 438-41; I A. LINDEY & L. PARLEY, supra note 12, § 9.05.
This issue has become particularly troublesome in North Carolina. See infra notes 272-77 and ac-
companying text.
29. See Sharp, supra note 9, at 1411.
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set forth above. There was some inconsistency,30 considerable confusion, espe-
cially with regard to the relationship between agreements and decrees, 3 1 and a
few well-settled rules.32 And although North Carolina domestic law has always
contained some highly unique legislative provisions and judicial principles, 33 a
conscientious effort to analyze and integrate the major principles governing set-
tlement agreements could yield largely reliable, if not particularly satisfying,
conclusions.34 The judiciary and the practicing domestic bar might have found
the going difficult, but not impossible. Unfortunately, such is no longer the case.
Within the past decade several developments-notably the passage of equi-
table distribution, a line of decisions from the court of appeals, and a single case
from the supreme court-have reduced the law of settlement agreements to a
conglomeration of irreconcilable, confusing, and often unworkable principles.
The extent and significance of these developments, from both a public policy and
a practical standpoint, cannot be overestimated. There are no true villains in
this sad piece of what approaches analytical rubble, but there are a multitude of
victims: trial court judges who state in open court that appellate opinions are so
irreconcilable as to be meaningless for precedential value;35 expert domestic law-
yers so confounded by the state of the law that they often draft thirty- to forty-
page agreements, not to provide for contingencies that might occur in the lives
of their clients, but rather to provide for contingencies that might occur with the
law; appellate judges who lack both the time and resources to attempt to untie
the various Gordian knots that entangle this area of the law; and clients who are
bewildered by the complexity of the documents they sign and all too often dis-
mayed by the consequences thereof.
At a different level, the most significant victim, and innocent bystander, of
this process is the current state and role of public policy in North Carolina. The
continuing dialectic between the interests of the state in retaining some control
over the incidents or processes of divorce and the interests of the parties in pri-
vate ordering of their dissolution consequences appears to have gone awry in
North Carolina. Quite simply, the settlement agreement process now seems to
be largely unguided by meaningful principles of public policy or judicial re-
30. See, e.g., supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text, for an indication of the difficulty North
Carolina courts have had in determining whether or not a "contract between husband and wife falls
within a special classification." Tripp v. Tripp, 266 N.C. 378, 379, 146 S.E.2d 507, 508 (1966).
31. This was especially true for a time regarding the issue of whether "incorporation by refer-
ence" resulted in merger. See Sharp, supra note 2, at 857-58; discussion infra at text accompanying
notes 58-59.
32. See, eg., Jones v. Lewis, 243 N.C. 259, 261, 90 S.E.2d 547, 549 (1955) (repeating the gen-
eral and established rule that reconciliation voids the executory portions of a property division).
Unfortunately, the continued validity of this principle-along with a great many others-has been
greatly undermined. See infra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
33. See, eg., discussion of the reconciliation rules infra note 235 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of that unique creature of North Carolina law, the privy exam statute, see Sharp, supra
note 2, at 828, 833. See also infra note 50, for a brief summary of the effect of this statute on judicial
review in North Carolina.
34. See, eg., this author's earlier attempt to analyze these major principles in Sharp, supra note
2.
35. The anecdote is hearsay but was repeated frequently and earnestly to the author by many
members of the domestic bar at its 1990 Annual Meeting.
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view.3 6 To some extent, much of this confusion can be traced to the enactment
of the Equitable Distribution of Property Act-a statutory scheme that intro-
duced entirely new concepts into a state in which title alone long had controlled
the distribution of property upon divorce.37 To a surprising extent much of this
process can be traced to a rather simple, but nonetheless profound, confusion
surrounding the meaning of the terms "separation agreement" and "property
settlement."
'38
This Article attempts to trace the origin of these developments in the previ-
ous decade, to demonstrate the extent, and consequences, of the present state of
confusion in the law governing settlement agreements, and to suggest corrective,
or at least ameliorative, steps that might be appropriate for judicial and legisla-
tive consideration. It will focus upon the relationship between settlement agree-
ments and final divorce decrees, and upon the effect of reconciliation of the
parties on a settlement agreement-both areas in which a profound, and unnec-
essary, confusion between the terms "separation agreement" and "property set-
tlement agreement" has produced extraordinarily unfortunate results.
This Article is premised upon three major assumptions. The first assump-
tion is that settlement agreements are fundamentally different from other kinds
of contracts. They deal with issues of custody, support, and distribution of
wealth that have consequences of immense significance, not only to the parties
involved, but to the state as well.3 9 The second assumption is that precisely
because of the distinctive nature of such contracts, the state has a very real inter-
est in, at a minimum, imposing a mechanism-judicial approval or review-
through which it can ensure, first, that such agreements are, within broad pa-
rameters, fair and reasonable, 4° and second, that they are thus accorded res judi-
36. With the repeal of the privy examination statute, discussed infra, at note 50, there are only
two relevant statutory provisions regarding contracts between husbands and wives. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 52-10.1 (1984) ("Any married couple is hereby authorized to execute a separation agreement
not inconsistent with public policy which shall be legal, valid, and binding in all respects .... ")
(emphasis added); id. § 50-20(d) (1987) ("Before, during or after marriage the parties may by written
agreement... provide for distribution of the maritalproperty in a manner deemed by the parties to
be equitable and the agreement shall be binding on the parties.") (emphasis added). The italicized
portions of the statutes do tend to confirm the highly technical distinctions between "property" and
"separation" agreements currently being drawn by courts. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying
text.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20, 50-21 (1987). For a further discussion of the Equitable Distri-
bution of Property Act, see infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 2; infra notes 45, 111-18 and accompanying texts. Passage of the Equitable
Distribution of Property Act has contributed greatly to the confusion surrounding, and importance
of, these terms.
39. For a more detailed discussion of this proposition, see Sharp, supra note 9, at 1405-06. The
"feminization of poverty" has become, of course, an almost hackneyed expression, but the phenome-
non and its relationship to divorce are nonetheless quite real. See, eg., L. WErrzMAN, THE DI-
VORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN
AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); Espenshade, The Economic Consequences of Divorce, 41 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. COUNSELING 615 (1979); Hoffman, Marital Instability and the Economic Status
of Women, 14 DEMOGRAPHY 67, 69 (1977) (all documenting the rather drastic decline in the eco-
nomic status of women and children after divorce). In North Carolina the Administrative Office of
the Courts estimated in 1986 that over forty percent of families headed by women subsisted at a level
below the federal poverty guidelines. 10 N.C.B.A. FAM. F. 1 (Aug. 1989).
40. This is roughly the standard for judicial review used in virtually all other states. See supra
note 14. Requiring some mechanism for judicial review does not, of course, ensure the effectiveness
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cata effect.4 1 The final assumption is that a public policy that allows parties
great freedom to determine the distributional consequences of divorce through
private agreement is by no means inconsistent with a policy that recognizes the
legitimate state interest in imposing some limits on this freedom to contract.42
II. AGREEMENT AND DECREE
A. The Traditional Rules
Like most states, North Carolina has had a difficult time accommodating
the interests of the parties in private ordering of the incidents of divorce and the
policy interests of the state in imposing some limits on freedom to contract.43
That tension has long been reflected in the development of two almost wholly
irreconcilable judicial attitudes toward settlement agreements-one asserting
and one denying that such agreements should be treated like "any other con-
tract." 44 Much of that same tension, however, has also been reflected in the
development of the law governing the relationship between settlement, or sepa-
ration agreements,45 and subsequent divorce decrees. As in the majority of
states, in North Carolina three major consequences depend upon this ultimate
or efficiency of such review. See Sharp, supra note 9, at 1409. It is, however, a first step toward a
process of meaningful judicial approval, and a necessary step for the attachment of res judicata
consequences to an agreement. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 202-13 and accompanying text for a more thorough explanation of the rela-
tionship between judicial review (and fact finding) and the application, through res judicata princi-
ples, of changed circumstances standards to modification of child custody and support decrees.
42. At a minimum, judicial approval should seek to ensure that the procedures through which a
settlement agreement is concluded are free from fraud, undue influence, or duress. As explained in
more detail, infra note 50, these principles are sadly underdeveloped in North Carolina domestic
law. See also Note, Duties of Fairness Between Separating Spouses: North Carolina Continues to Find
that all is Fair in Love and Divorce, 67 N.C.L. REv. 1397 (1989) (containing a detailed summary of
North Carolina law in this area, particularly since passage of the Equitable Distribution of Property
Act in 1983).
43. No longer, of course, does the state consider itself a true partner to the marriage contract.
But see Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945), where the supreme court observed
that: "There are three parties to a marriage contract-the husband, the wife and the State. For this
reason marriage is denominated a status, and certain incidents are attached thereto by law which
may not be abrogated without the consent of the third party, the State." Id. at 453, 35 S.E.2d at 415.
Although this is probably still an accurate statement of the power of the state to control the incidents
of divorce, our courts recently have consented to an almost unparalleled freedom to contract. See
infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; see also McIntosh v. McIntosh, 74 N.C. App.
554, 556, 328 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1985) (courts throw a "cloak of protection" around transactions
between husband and wife to ensure that they are "fair and reasonable"); McDowell v. McDowell,
61 N.C. App. 700, 705, 301 S.E.2d 729, 732 (1983) ("However, as courts do not make contracts, we
are not permitted to inquire into whether the contract was good or bad, wise or foolish.").
45. The term "separation agreement" has been employed most frequently by North Carolina
courts in the broad sense. Technically, however, such an agreement deals only with marital support
rights, Sharp, supra note 2, at 826, and is thus too narrow a term to encompass agreements that deal
with support and property rights. Lee, for example, emphasizes that there is a
recognized legal distinction between a true separation agreement and a true property settle-
ment .... A true property settlement is a division and allotment of property and property
interests between the parties; it says nothing about support or alimony for the wife, custody
or support of children, or the right to live separate and apart.
2 R. LEE, supra note 10, at 460; see also Stanley v. Cox, 253 N.C. 620, 629, 117 S.E.2d 826, 832
(1961) (discussing same distinction between a property settlement and separation agreement). For a
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relationship between the decree and agreement or, stated differently, upon the
nature of the final consent judgment:46 whether spousal support provisions were
modifiable, whether contempt would be available for enforcement of support
provisions, and what res judicata consequences attached to the agreement provi-
sions that were modifiable.
In 1964 the North Carolina Supreme Court attempted, with some success
and considerable coherence, to explain the status of the law in this area in the
seminal case of Bunn v. Bunn.47 The court began with the simple proposition
that there were two types of consent judgments available to parties in North
Carolina. In the first, the court "merely approves or sanctions the payments
which the husband has agreed to make for the wife's support and sets them out
in a judgment against him. Such a judgment constitutes nothing more than a
contract between the parties made with the approval of the court."'48 Because
they were not court-ordered, spousal payments could not constitute technical
alimony.49 This Type I consent judgment, the court concluded, "may not be
enforced by contempt proceedings," and the alimony provisions thereof could
not be "changed or set aside except with the consent of both parties in the ab-
sence of a finding that the agreement was unfair to the wife or that her consent
was obtained by fraud or mutual mistake."
50
detailed explanation of how critical this distinction has become, see supra note 2 and accompanying
text and infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
46. In North Carolina, prior to 1967, permanent alimony could not be awarded incident to an
absolute divorce; therefore, consent judgments were the exclusive instruments for embodying the
agreements of the parties. 2 R. LEE, supra note 10, at 188. In 1967 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
16.8(b)(1) was amended to allow permanent alimony to be awarded in an action for divorce, "either
absolute or from bed and board." Act of July 6, 1967, ch. 1152, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1769. Thu3,
prior to the amendment, agreements including alimony had to be entered as consent judgments prior
to any decree of final divorce. Since 1967, of course, courts have been free to adopt or approve
settlement agreements in the divorce decree itself, but the consent judgment device and terminology
have survived. The rules pertaining to agreements embodied in some form either in divorce decrees
or in consent judgments, however, were, and have remained, the same. For a more detailed discus-
sion of this somewhat unusual domestic law history, see Sharp, supra note 2, at 854.
47. 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964), overruled in part by Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381,
386, 298 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1983). This was undoubtedly the single most significant case in North
Carolina domestic law for nearly two decades. But see infra text accompanying note 89.
48. Bunn, 262 N.C. at 69, 136 S.E.2d at 242. The opinion obviously predates the amendment
to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.8, discussed supra at note 46, so that it speaks solely in terms of "con-
sent judgments."
49. Bunn, 262 N.C. at 69, 136 S.E.2d at 242.
50. Id. The last clause of the quoted material in the text is somewhat misleading because con-
sent judgments or settlement agreements have virtually never been set aside for unfairness in North
Carolina. This was owing in part to the existence of the infamous privy examination statute, in effect
from 1905 until its repeal in January of 1978. Act of May 13, 1977, ch. 375, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess.
Laws 375. For a detailed history of this statute, see Spencer v. Spencer, 37 N.C. App. 481, 486, 246
S.E.2d 805, 809 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 958 (1979). Before its repeal, N.C. GEN. STAT § 52-
6(a) (1976) stated that "nor shall any separation agreement between husband and wife be valid for
any purpose, unless such contract or separation agreement is in writing, and is acknowledged before
a certifying officer who shall make a private examination of the wife." The statute also required that
such officer make findings as to whether the contract was "unreasonable or injurious to the wife,"
and that the ultimate certification "be conclusive of the facts therein stated but may be impeached
for fraud." Id. § 52-6(b). Thus, this statute, which was designed to protect wives, had the ironic
effect of virtually immunizing agreements from attack for unfairness, duress, and overreaching, once
the certification was complete. Moreover, because the statute in effect delegated the task of review of
settlement agreements to magistrates, judicial review of such contracts was unnecessary and thus
perfunctory at best. Unfortunately, this practice continued after the repeal of North Carolina Gen-
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By contrast, in the Type II consent judgment the court "adopts the agree-
ment of the parties as its own determination of their respective rights and obliga-
tions and orders the husband to pay the specified amounts as alimony." 5 1 Such
a judgment, as "an order of the court, may be modified by the court at any time
changed conditions make a modification right and proper."52 The court then
concluded that when issues of modifiability of support or enforcement by con-
tempt arise, "the question for the court in each case is whether the provision for
the wife contained therein rests only upon contract or is an adjudication of the
court. If it rests on both, it is no less a decree of the court."'53
The Bunn court thus set forth a relatively simple "either/or" approach to
agreements and subsequent decrees. Either an agreement was "adopted" by the
trial court, in which case its support provisions would be both modifiable and
enforceable by contempt, or the agreement was "merely approved," in which
case alimony would be nonmodifiable and the agreement enforceable only as an
"ordinary contract."'54 It is important to note, however, that by 1979 these "or-
dinary contract" remedies for Type I consent judgments were'held to include
decrees for specific performance. 55 As a result, the Type I consent judgments
could also be enforced by contempt order, but only after an order for specific
performance had been obtained. The fundamental duality of the Bunn approach
nonetheless remained intact.
Statement of these principles, however, turned out to be considerably easier
than application and two major problems arose, with frustrating regularity, for
almost twenty years after the Bunn decision. The first of these problems in-
volved the means by which an agreement would, or would not, be merged into a
decree. Both prior to and for some years after Bunn, appellate courts employed
eral Statutes § 50-6. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Avriett v. Avriett, 88 N.C. App.
506, 509-11, 363 S.E.2d 875, 878-80, aff'd per curiam, 322 N.C. 468, 368 S.E.2d 377 (1988).
51. Bunn, 262 N.C. at 69, 136 S.E.2d at 242. It is important to note that the statutory defini-
tion of technical alimony under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.8 (1987) requires a court order. The
significance of this first requirement for technical alimony is discussed in more detail infra, at note
167 and accompanying text. The distinction between provisions called "alimony" and technical
alimony is well recognized elsewhere. See Annotation, Divorce" Power of Courts to Modify Decree
for Alimony or Support of Spouse Which Was Based on Agreement of Parties, 61 A.L.R.3D 520, 528-
29 (1975); supra note 46.
52. Bunn, 262 N.C. at 69, 136 S.E.2d at 242; see also Cavenaugh v. Cavenaugh, 317 N.C. 652,
659, 347 S.E.2d 19, 24 (1986) (By incorporating a separation agreement into the judgment, the "trial
judge made that agreement an order of the court subject to modification based on changed
circumstances.").
53. Bunn, 262 N.C. at 70, 136 S.E.2d at 243.
54. Id. at 69, 136 S.E.2d at 242. This approach thus largely avoided the confusion and com-
plexity of the second option, discussed supra at text accompanying note 23, wherein a hybrid con-
tract and decree could exist simultaneously. But see infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
55. Moore v. Moore, 297 N.C. 14, 252 S.E.2d 735 (1979), is the leading case. It required that a
plaintiff seeking specific performance of an alimony agreement demonstrate that there was no "ade-
quate remedy at law." Id. at 16, 252 S.E.2d at 737. The multiplicity of suits that plaintiff had
brought, plus "a deliberate pattern of conduct by defendant to defeat plaintiff's rights under their
separation agreement" amply demonstrated the inadequacy of plaintiff wife's contract remedies. Id.
at 18, 252 S.E.2d at 738-39. See also Haynes v. Haynes, 45 N.C. App. 376, 383, 263 S.E.2d 783, 787
(1980) (failure to comply with decree of specific performance might be punishable by contempt);
Note, Enforcement of Contractual Separation Agreements by Specific Performance-Moore v.
Moore, 16 WAKE FoRESr L. REv. 117 (1980) (considering whether an order of specific performance
subjects a spouse to contempt).
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a highly technical interpretation of the "adoption" procedure. Unless the court
order specifically "ordered, adjudged and decreed" the precise terms of the un-
derlying settlement agreement, no merger would occur.56 For years no variation
from this rigid approach was allowed. Thus, in one case in which the court
ordered, adjudged, and decreed that "the parties have agreed that the plaintiff
shall pay," the supreme court held that, because the decree had not specifically
ordered the husband to pay, enforcement by contempt order was unavailable.
57
Apparently the supreme court soon wearied of such an elevation of form
over substance, and in 1978 in a somewhat abrupt, but wholly sensible change of
course, it expanded the "adoption" procedure to include agreements which were
"incorporated by reference" into consent judgments.5 8 Thus, support provisions
of agreements would be considered merged, and therefore modifiable and en-
forceable by contempt, if they were either "ordered, adjudged, and decreed" or
"incorporated by reference" into the decree.5 9
The second problem that courts confronted after Bunn created and contin-
ues to create6° even greater confusion. As the Bunn court fully recognized, sup-
port or pure "separation" agreements are likely, at a practical if not also at an
analytical level, to be inextricably linked with provisions for a division of prop-
erty.6 1 It is also quite common for parties to structure property division as ali-
mony for tax or other purposes. 62 The Bunn court therefore grafted onto its
56. See, eg., Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 133-34, 37 S.E.2d 118, 120-21 (1946).
57. Holden v. Holden, 245 N.C. 1, 3, 9, 95 S.E.2d 118, 120, 124 (1956).
58. Levitch v. Levitch, 294 N.C. 437, 439-40, 241 S.E.2d 506, 507-08 (1978), overruled by Wal-
ters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 386, 298 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1983). For a more expanded treatment of
this development, see Sharp, supra note 2, at 857-58. The increased flexibility for the creation of
merged agreements allowed by Levitch was partially a response to numerous cases in which the
parties, and the trial court, had clearly intended to merge the agreement but had omitted the "magic
words" Bunn seemed to require. See, eg., Williford v. Williford, 10 N.C. App. 451, 179 S.E.2d 114,
cert. denied, 278 N.C. 301, 180 S.E.2d 178 (1971).
59. It should be noted that the intent of the rendering court with regard to merger, as evidenced
by its use of the appropriate language, was paramount. Any expression of intent of the parties
deemed to be contrary to the intent of the court was irrelevant. The agreement in Levitch, for
instance, specifically provided that it "shall survive this Judgment." Levitch, 249 N.C. at 438, 241
S.E.2d at 507. The supreme court held that, notwithstanding such language, the contract was
merged into the decree. Id. at 440, 241 S.E.2d at 508. Confusion persisted in this area of the law,
however, and it was not uncommon for agreements to provide both that the contract be "incorpo-
rated" in the decree and that alimony be nonmodifiable-a result that is, of course, impossible be-
cause, after Levitch, incorporation worked a merger of the agreement into the decree so that alimony
was modifiable, regardless of any contrary intention expressed in the agreement. See, e.g., Acosta v.
Clark, 70 N.C. App. 111, 114-15, 318 S.E.2d 551, 554 (1984). This continuing confusion probably,
in part, led the supreme court to its misguided attempt to "clarify" this area of the law in Walters v.
Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983). See infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text. In
many states, however, parties can provide for nonmodifiable alimony by agreement subsequently
merged into a decree. See, eg., In re Marriage of Smiley, 53 Cal. App. 3d 228, 233, 125 Cal. Rptr
717, 721 (1975); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 256 Ga. 102, 344 S.E.2d 423 (1986).
60. See infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
61. See H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 594, 777. Professor Clark correctly observes that the "task
of making a rational distinction between the two [separation and property agreements] becomes
difficult, indeed impossible." Id. at 594.
62. Installment payments, regardless of the label attached thereto, so intertwined with a prop-
erty division as to be a part thereof, do not meet the second prong of the definition of alimony. The
first prong, it will be recalled, is that there be a court order. See supra note 51. The second is that
the payments be made for the support of the dependent spouse. See Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129,
133, 37 S.E.2d 118, 120 (1946); infra text accompanying notes 171-73.
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"either/or" rule the common, 63 and common sense, proviso that "a judgment
which purports to be a complete settlement of all property and marital rights
between the parties and which does not award alimony within the accepted defi-
nition of that term is not subject to modification even though it adjudges that the
wife recover a specific money judgment." 64 The court explained that although
property and support provisions might be separable portions of a judgment, 65 "if
the support provision and the division of property constitute a reciprocal consid-
eration so that the entire agreement would be destroyed by a modification of the
support provision, they are not separable and may not be changed without the
consent of both parties."
66
The court's quid pro quo analysis on this point is both clear and correct:
because property divisions are not modifiable, 67 installment payments made in
full or partial consideration for such property division provisions are similarly
not modifiable, regardless of whether the payments are adopted by a court order.
Allowing modification of payments labeled alimony in such an "integrated"
68
agreement would, in effect, allow one party the benefit of the bargain while po-
63. See, eg., Hartsfield v. Hartsfield, 384 So. 2d 1097, 1098-99 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980), cert
denied, 384 So. 2d 1100 (Ala. 1980) (alimony "in gross" nonmodifiable even upon wife's remarriage);
States v. States, 124 Ariz. 189, 191, 603 P.2d 81, 83 (1979) (monthly payments to wife constituted
part of property settlement and so were nonmodifiable); Steines v. Steines, 538 P.2d 491, 493 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1975) (monthly payments nonmodifiable because inseparable from property division);
Bockoven v. Bockoven, 444 So. 2d 30, 31-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (provision for "support and
maintenance" of wife in fact part of property division and thus nonmodifiable); Kiffer v. Kiffer, 410
N.W.2d 454, 457 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (alimony award actually part of nonmodiflable property
settlement). See also cases collected in Annotation, supra note 51, at 590 (noting that "the rule has
been developed that where an agreement's provisions for support are an integral and inseparable part
of the property settlement,... a decree based on that agreement cannot be modified with respect to
support").
64. Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 70, 136 S.E.2d 240,243 (1964), overruled in part by Walters v.
Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 386, 298 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1983). Language in an agreement setting forth the
parties' intention that it constitute a "complete" or "final" settlement of their property and marital
(or support) rights has frequently been held to be strong evidence that the agreement was integrated.
See Annotation, supra note 51, at 602-12.
65. Bunn, 262 N.C. at 70, 136 S.E.2d at 243. The court continued to state the general rule that
if the provisions were severable, "the division of property would be beyond the power of the court to
change, but the order for future installments of alimony would be subject to modification in a proper
case." Id.
66. Id.
67. See I VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, supra note 24, § 4.02, at
38 ("The general rule is that the property division provisions of a court order based on a separation
agreement are not judicially modifiable.... "). The author goes on to note certain limited exceptions
to this rule, such as statutes that may provide for modification of home occupancy awards or that
may provide for modification in order to permit division of military pensions. Id. Otherwise it is
clear that property divisions are uniformly held to be nonmodifiable. See Holsomback v. Hol-
somback, 273 N.C. 728, 732, 161 S.E.2d 99, 102 (1968); Kiger v. Kiger, 258 N.C. 126, 129, 128
S.E.2d 235, 237 (1962); King v. King, 225 N.C. 639, 640, 35 S.E.2d 893, 894 (1945); Cobb v. Cobb,
54 N.C. App. 230, 232, 282 S.E.2d 591, 592 (1981), cert. denied, 304 N.C. 724, 288 S.E.2d 509
(1982) (all standing squarely for the proposition that property divisions are nonmodifiable). But see
infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text, for what might be interpreted as a startling reversal of
this long-standing rule.
68. The term "integrated" agreement is most commonly used in North Carolina. See, eg.,
Marks v. Marks, 316 N.C. 447, 451, 342 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1986); Cecil v. Cecil, 59 N.C. App. 208,
210-11, 296 S.E.2d 329, 330-31 (1982), disc. rev. denied, 307 N.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 220 (1983); Hen-
derson v. Henderson, 55 N.C. App. 506, 507, 286 S.E.2d 657, 659 (1982), aff'd, 307 N.C. 401, 298
S.E.2d 345 (1983); Britt v. Britt, 36 N.C. App. 705, 711, 245 S.E.2d 381, 385 (1978).
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tentially denying the corollary benefit to the other party.69 Moreover, as subse-
quent portions of this Article will illustrate in some detail, such payments do not
meet the technical definition of alimony and, therefore, should be nonmodifiable
for this reason as well.
70
Subsequent cases have confirmed and elaborated upon this all-important
principle of reciprocal consideration. In the leading case, White v. White,71 the
supreme court enunciated the principle quite clearly: periodic support pay-
ments, even if labeled as alimony, "may not be alimony within the meaning of
the statute and thus modifiable if they and other provisions for a property divi-
sion between the parties constitute reciprocal consideration for each other."72
The White court went on to hold that although the issue of whether or not an
agreement was integrated turned upon the intentions of the parties, 73 in the ab-
sence of a clear indicia of intent, there should be a presumption "that provisions
in a separation agreement or consent judgment made a part of the court's order
are separable and that provisions for support payments therein are subject to
modification." 74
The principles that emerged from this series of cases were, by 1980, rela-
tively straightforward: a "Type II" consent judgment could be created through
a decree that "ordered, adjudged, and decreed" the recited terms of the settle-
ment agreement, or by a decree that incorporated such agreement by reference.
The alimony provisions of such a consent judgment were modifiable, unless,
under White, they were determined to be reciprocal consideration for a property
division. The support provisions of such agreements were subject to enforce-
ment by contempt. On the other hand, if the court merely approved the agree-
ment of the parties, the alimony provisions would be nonmodifiable, regardless
of whether or not the agreement was integrated. Such an agreement would be
enforceable by contract remedies only, unless, under Moore v. Moore,75 remedies
at law were deemed so inadequate that a decree for specific performance would
69. It should be noted that the power to modify an alimony award includes the power to termi-
nate such award: "An order of a court of this State for alimony ... may be modified or vacated
." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a) (1987).
70. See infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
71. 296 N.C. 661, 252 S.E.2d 698 (1979). See also Henderson v. Henderson, 307 N.C. 401, 406-
07, 298 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1983) (discussing requirements for true alimony); Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C.
177, 184-86, 287 S.E.2d 840, 844-46 (1982) (same).
72. White, 296 N.C. at 666, 252 S.E.2d at 701.
73. In Jones v. Jones, 42 N.C. App. 467, 256 S.E.2d 474 (1979), the court found that the
following factors were indicia of the parties' intent to create an integrated agreement: that the pay-
ments were contingent upon the wife's leaving the house and conveying her half of the house to her
husband, that the payments were limited to thirty-two months' duration, that there was no finding
that grounds for alimony existed, and that there was no finding that the wife was a dependent
spouse. Id. at 471, 256 S.E.2d at 476; see also supra note 59 (intent of the court the critical factor in
determining if an agreement had been incorporated or merged).
74. White, 296 N.C. at 672, 252 S.E.2d at 704. It should be noted that courts lacked the power
to make any distribution of property incident to divorce until 1981. See Sharp, Equitable Distribu-
tion of Property in North Carolina: A Preliminary Analysis, 61 N.C.L. REV. 247, 247 (1983). The
presumption of separability was thus consistent with the state of the law at that time. It would
appear, however, that with passage of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1987), a presumption of integration
would better accord with the realities of most divorce bargaining.
75. 297 N.C. 14, 252 S.E.2d 735 (1975); see supra note 55.
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be granted. Property divisions were in any event beyond the power of the court
to modify.
76
Some confusion persisted, nevertheless, particularly with regard to whether
"adopted" agreements were integrated or not.77 This confusion was both unnec-
essary and unfortunate: unnecessary because the intentions of the parties easily
could have been identified by the inclusion of integration or nonintegration
clauses in the agreement;78 unfortunate because it may have been partly appel-
late frustration with the failure of parties and their lawyers to indicate such
intentions clearly that led to the supreme court's decision in Walters v. Wal-
ters79-a case that, in all likelihood, marks a more abrupt, drastic, and unsound
change in both the law and public policy of North Carolina than any other in
the history of the domestic law of the state.
B. Walters
Walters v. Walters originated as a relatively standard case involving the
issue of the modifiability of the alimony provisions of a 1978 consent judgment
that had been merged into the decree of the lower court.80 The only issue before
the court of appeals was whether the alimony provision was reciprocal consider-
ation for a property division.81 The court held, quite sensibly given the nature of
the "alimony" provisions, that the separability presumption of White v. White 
82
had been overcome and that the payments were thus nonmodifiable.
8 3
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals in a remarkable opinion,
the apparent simplicity of which utterly belies its scope, complexity, and internal
76. See cases cited supra note 67.
77. See, eg., Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177,287 S.E.2d 840 (1982); Cecil v. Cecil, 59 N.C. App.
208, 296 S.E.2d 329 (1982), disc. rev. denied, 307 N.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 220 (1983); Henderson v.
Henderson, 55 N.C. App. 506, 286 S.E.2d 657 (1982), aff'd, 307 N.C. 401, 298 S.E.2d 345 (1983).
There was also some confusion as to the res judicata effect to be accorded custody and child support
arrangements based upon agreements. The scope of this problem has been greatly amplified as a
result of the decision in Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983). See infra text
accompanying notes 202-07.
78. An excellent example of an integrated agreement clause appears in Henderson v. Hender-
son, 55 N.C. App. 506, 507, 286 S.E.2d 657, 659 (1982), where the agreement provided simply that it
was an "integrated agreement of the parties, that each provision contained herein is intended to be in
consideration for each of the other provisions." For a nonintegration provision, see Britt v. Britt, 36
N.C. App. 705, 711, 245 S.E.2d 381, 385 (1978) ("The provisions for the support.. . of wife are
independent of any division or agreement for division of property between the parties, and shall not
for any purpose be deemed to be... integrated with a property settlement of the parties.").
79. 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983).
80. Walters v. Walters, 54 N.C. App. 545, 545-47, 284 S.E.2d 151, 152-53 (1981), rev'd, 307
N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983).
81. Id. at 545-48, 284 S.E.2d at 152-53. The agreement called for the payment of $1,000 per
month for sixty-three months, and specifically provided for such payments to continue regardless of
any remarriage of the wife. Id. Plaintiff wife had remarried, and husband had ceased making pay-
ments. Id.
82. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
83. Walters, 54 N.C. App. at 548-51, 284 S.E.2d at 153-55. Provisions for payment of fixed
amounts of alimony beyond the remarriage of the recipient spouse are a hallmark of an integrated
agreement. See Annotation, Power to Modify Spousal Support Award for a Limited Term, Issued in
Conjunction with Divorce, so as to Extend the Term or Make the Award Permanent, 62 A.L.R. 4TH
180, 190 (1988).
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confusion.84 It ignored completely the integration issue and instead conducted a
cursory, and partially inaccurate,8 - review of the law of consent judgments, ob-
serving that "non-court ordered consent judgments generate great confusion in
the area of family law."'8 6 Apparently, for this reason, and this reason alone, the
court leapt to the almost wholly unsupported, and largely insupportable,8 7 con-
clusion that "[w]e now see no significant reason for the continued recognition of
two separate forms of consent judgments within the area of domestic relations
law."
88
Based on this rather superficial assessment of the law in this area, the court
then reached the following, and to say the least, surprising, conclusion:
Instead of following this dual consent judgment approach in family
law, we now establish a rule that whenever the parties bring their sepa-
ration agreements before the court for the court's approval, it will no
longer be treated as a contract between the parties. All separation
agreements approved by the court as judgments of the court will be
treated similarly, to-wit, as court ordered judgments. These court or-
dered separation agreements, as consent judgments, are modifiable,
and enforceable by the contempt powers of the court, in the same man-
ner as any other judgment in a domestic relations case. Insofar as this
rule is in conflict with the previous decisions of this Court in Bunn v.
Bunn . . .and Levitch v. Levitch .... those cases will no longer
control.
8 9
Then, presumably by way of explanation, the court explained that: "This is not
a harsh rule. The parties can avoid the burdens of a court judgment by not
submitting their agreement to the court. By not coming to court, the parties
preserve their agreement as a contract, to be enforced and modified under tradi-
tional contract principles." 90 Finally, and most surprisingly, the court appeared
to suggest that even unexecuted property division portions of agreements ap-
proved by a court could be subject to modification. 91
Thus, in two brief pages, the supreme court abolished the "mere approval"
84. Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 387, 298 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1983).
85. See infra notes' 101-02 and accompanying text.
86. Walters, 307 N.C. at 386, 298 S.E.2d at 342. It should be noted that such confusion as
existed lay more in the application by lawyers-and lower court judges of the rules summarized earlier
in this Article than in the rules theinselves. Appellate courts' repeated warnings that judgments be
worded with care apparently often went unheeded. See, eg., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253,
258, 154 S.E.2d 71, 75 (1967); Williford v. Williford, 10 N.C. App. 529, 531, 179 S.E.2d 113, 114,
cert denied, 278 N.C. 301, 180 S.E.2d 177 (1971). As noted previously, the principles governing this
area of the law were relatively well settled by the early 1980s. See supra notes 54-55 and accompany-
ing text.
87. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text for a critique of the court's conclusions.
88. Waiters, 307 N.C. at 386, 298 S.E.2d at 341-42. Even at this early stage of analysis of the
court's opinion, it is impossible to resist the observation that the court's lack of appreciation of the
function of court approval of agreements is, at a minimum, shortsighted.
89. Id. at 386, 298 S.E.2d at 342. The court also held that this "new rule" would have prospec-
ive application only. Id.
90. Id. (emphasis added). It is important to note that the court clearly does view judicial ap-
proval of agreements as a "burden" for parties. As later portions of this Article will demonstrate,
courts also apparently feel burdened by judicial review.
91. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
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consent agreement option and created in its place a "contract only" procedure
for which no judicial approval of settlement agreements whatsoever is necessary.
It must be emphasized that this latter procedure: 1) represents an unrestrained
freedom to contract that is virtually unparalleled among the fifty states;92 2)
authorizes a system of divorce by mutual consent that would appear to contra-
vene long established public policy in North Carolina;93 and 3) creates serious
res judicata issues in the (not unlikely) event that a party seeks judicial modifica-
tion of the child support or custody provisions of a "contract only" agreement. 94
The opinion as a whole, moreover, rests upon the assumption that the applica-
tion and effect of "ordinary contract principles" will be sufficient to meet the
needs of divorcing parties-an assumption that at both policy and practical
levels, has already proved to be incorrect.95 Each of these consequences will be
discussed in considerable detail in subsequent portions of this Article.
Before proceeding further, however, it is necessary to point out that Walters
does much more than simply create, and indeed urge use of, a "contract only"
option. Whether or not by design, the effect of the opinion as a whole is actively
to discourage parties from seeking court approval of their agreements, a conse-
quence which has unfortunate policy and practical implications.96 It does this
by threatening the finality of court-approved agreements in two ways: first, by
casting doubt upon the continued viability of the reciprocal consideration and
integrated agreement principle, and second by seeming to suggest that some por-
tions of property divisions may be modifiable. Because divisions of property are
nonmodifiable, virtually by definition, and certainly by necessity,97 it is the latter
suggestion that constitutes the most serious obstacle to the practice of seeking
court approval of settlement agreements.
9 8
Oddly, the source for this potentially most serious aspect of the Walters
opinion derives from the court's inartful attempt to describe previous law. As
part of its explanation of the "many years of confusion"99 surrounding the es-
tablished principles of law in this area, the supreme court attempted to summa-
rize prior law as follows:
As an order of the court, the court adopted separation agreement is
enforceable through the court's contempt powers.. . . ' In addition to
being enforceable by contempt, the provisions of a court ordered sepa-
ration agreement within a consent judgment are modifiable within cer-
92. See Brogan, supra note 2, at 241-42; supra note 14. Louisiana apparently allows parties the
option of a "contract only" agreement with regard to alimony. See, e.g., Spencer v. Spencer, 472 So.
2d 302 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
93. See supra note 50 (discussion of the privy exam statute).
94. See infra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 40.
97. See supra note 67; infra note 102.
98. Analytically, of course, modification of unexecuted portions of property division and modi-
fication of "alimony" portions of an integrated agreement are identical, since installment alimony
payments are in fact nothing more than unexecuted portions of a property division. See supra notes
71-74 and accompanying text. Because not all settlement agreements are integrated, however, the
two issues will be treated separately here.
99. Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 386 298 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1983).
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tain carefully delineated limitations. As the law now stands, if the
provision in question concerns alimony, the issue of modifiability is
determined by G.S. 50-16.9. However, if the provisions in question con-
cern some aspect of a property settlement, then it may be modified only
so long as the court's order remains unsatisfied as to that specific provi-
sion .... Therefore, property provisions which have not been satisfied
may be modified.l10
The suggestion that previous (or current)10 1 North Carolina law holds that
nonexecuted portions of a court-ordered property settlement might be subject to
modification is wholly inconsistent with what is perhaps the most well-estab-
lished principle of family law in this state, and elsewhere; property divisions,
whether merged into a final decree of divorce or not, are final, and thus not
subject to modification.10 2 If such a property division provision is merged into
an order, of course, it becomes not only final, but a final judgment, and a clear
distinguishing feature of a final judgment is that it is not subject to judicial modi-
100. Id. at 385-86, 298 S.E.2d at 341 (emphasis added). In a later portion of the opinion, the
court, observed that
except as herein stated, consenting parties may still elect any of the options available to
them prior to this opinion. For example, the parties may keep the property settlement
provision aspects of their separation agreement out of court and in contract, while present-
ing their provision for alimony to the court for approval. The result of such action would
be that the alimony provision is enforceable and modifiable as a court order while the
property settlement provisions would be enforceable and modifiable under traditional con-
tract methods.
Id. at 386-87, 298 S.E.2d at 342. Traditional contract methods presumably include reformation and
voiding of portions or all of a contract for fraud, duress, undue influence, and sometimes unconsclo-
nability. See Sharp, supra note 9. Traditional contract remedies, however, do not include modifica-
tion, except under the most unusual of circumstances or with the consent of the parties. It is thus
possible to suggest that the court was somewhat careless with its use of the term "modification" with
regard to agreements that are merged into decrees or that retain independent validity as a contract.
The other alternative is simply to conclude that the court was incorrect in its summary of previous
law. See, eg., Note, A New Rule for Consent Judgments in Family Law, 6 CAMPBELL L. REv. 125,
126 (1984).
101. It is critical to note that at no point in its opinion does the supreme court specifically state
that henceforth any property division approved by a court will be subject to modification. See infra
notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
102. See H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 780; 1 VALUATION AND DIsTRIBuTION OF MARITAL
PROPERTY, supra note 24, § 4.02, at 38. See also Holsomback v. Holsomback, 273 N.C. 728, 732-33,
161 S.E.2d 99, 102-03 (1968) (after entry of consent judgment, division of property is beyond the
power of the court to modify absent ronsent of both parties); Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 70, 136
S.E.2d 240, 243 (1964) (division of property in a consent judgment is "beyond the power of the court
to change") overruled in part by Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 386, 298 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1983);
Kiger v. Kiger, 258 N.C. 126, 129, 128 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1962) (court without power to modify
absent consent of parties); King v. King, 225 N.C. 639, 640, 35 S.E.2d 893, 894 (1945) ("'It is a
settled principle of law.., that a consentjudgment... cannot be modified or set aside without the
consent of the parties thereto, except for fraud or mistake, and that in order to vacate such judgment
an independent action must be instituted ....... (quoting Keen v. Parker, 217 N.C. 378, 386-87, 8
S.E.2d 209, 214 (1940))); Cobb v. Cobb, 54 N.C. App. 230, 233, 282 S.E.2d 591, 593 (1981) ("A
judgment which determines property rights creates vested rights in the parties which cannot be
divested."), disc rev. denied, 304 N.C. 724, 288 S.E.2d 809 (1982). Note also that the Equitable
Distribution Act makes no provision whatsoever for modification of property divisions, whether
arrived at by agreement or by judicial determination. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1987). To the
contrary, the statute states that such agreements concerning marital property, if duly acknowledged
and deemed fair by the parties, "shall be binding on the parties." Id. § 50-20(d). For further discus-
sion of this statute, see infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
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fication. 10 3 That the supreme court intended to overrule such a cardinal princi-
ple of domestic law judgments in such an oblique, and confusing, manner is
virtually unthinkable. An argument can be made, moreover, that the court
spoke more broadly, and more loosely, than it intended or perhaps realized, and
that the established nonmodification principles remain intact.
The first link in this argument derives from the fact that, as authority for its
comments on the modification of property divisions, the court cited two un-
remarkable and obscure cases involving forced judicial sales.1 4 Those cases
stand for nothing more than the well-settled principle that even final judgments
remain open for some purposes, through appropriate motions.105 The power of
a court to entertain motions-to set aside a judgment under rule 60(b),10 6 or to
alter or amend under rule 59(e) 107-is, of course, neither the analytical nor the
technical equivalent of a blanket power to modify final judgments.10 8 Thus, an
103. See, ag., Reavis v. Reavis, 82 N.C. App. 77, 83, 345 S.E.2d 460, 464 (1986) ("The public
policy of this State seeks to promote certainty and finality in domestic dispute resolution .... ); see
also Bryant v. Shields, 220 N.C. 628, 634, 18 S.E.2d 157, 161 (1942) ("It is fundamental that a final
judgment... is conclusive of rights, questions and facts in issue... in all other actions involving the
same matter."); Blake v. Norman, 37 N.C. App. 617, 247 S.E.2d 256, disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 106,
250 S.E.2d 35 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 comment b (1980) ("[A] judg-
ment will ordinarily be considered final in respect to a claim... if it is not tentative, provisional, or
contingent.").
104. These two cases, the relevancy of which to domestic law does not readily leap to mind, are
Abernethy Land & Fin. Co. v. First Sec. Trust Co., 213 N.C. 369, 196 S.E. 340 (1938) (involving the
attempt by a judgment creditor to enjoin an execution sale by the administrator of an estate), and
Walton v. Cagle, 269 N.C. 177, 152 S.E.2d 312 (1967) (involving the attempt by a buyer at a judicial
sale to seek relief from the costs imposed upon him when he failed to comply with the winning bid).
In Walton the supreme court upheld the judgment charging the buyer with the costs of resale and
the difference between that price and the price at the original sale, citing Abernethy Land for the
proposition that the "court has authority to implement the judgment entered." Id. at 183, 152
S.E.2d at 317. Ironically, the Walton court also relied upon an earlier case, Johnson v. Futrell Bros.
Lumber Co., 225 N.C. 595, 35 S.E.2d 889 (1945), for the proposition that under a consent decree
"the court had no power to change its terms without consent of all parties, except upon the ground
of fraud or mistake." Walton, 269 N.C. at 180, 152 S.E.2d at 315.
105. In explaining the rights of the judgment creditor, the court in Abernethy Land stated that:
An action in court is not ended by the rendition of a judgment, but in certain respects it is
still pending until the judgment is satisfied. It is open to motion for execution, for the
recall of an execution, to determine proper credits and for other motions affecting the
existence of the judgment or the amount due thereon.
Abernethy Land, 213 N.C. at 371-72, 196 S.E. at 341-42.
106. N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b). Professor Clark gives the following summary: "Most, if not all,
jurisdictions.., provide that a party may be relieved from a judgment or decree on the ground of
mistake, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, or fraud." H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 551.
The purpose of such rules "is to provide for relief from final judgments when other methods, such as
motions for new trial or appeals, are no longer available." Id. North Carolina courts have been very
reluctant to grant rule 60(b) motions in the domestic law context. See, e.g., Goff v. Goff, 90 N.C.
App. 388, 393, 368 S.E.2d 419,422 (1988) (reversing a rule 60(b) motion for wife to set aside consent
order to provide for reimbursement of tax refund); Coleman v. Arnette, 48 N.C. App. 733, 735, 269
S.E.2d 755, 756 (1980) (motion denied where husband wanted to claim children as dependents:
court stated that rule cannot be used to "amend" a divorce judgment).
107. N.C.R. Civ. P. 59(e) provides that a judgment may be altered or amended on motion
served within ten days after entry of judgment. After that time, the judgment may be attacked only
under rule 60. See also C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 661 (4th ed. 1983) (explaining
practice under FED. R. Civ. P. 60).
108. "A judgment otherwise final for purposes of the law of res judicata is not deprived of such
finality by the fact that time still permits commencement of proceedings... to set aside thejudgment
and grant a new trial or the like .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 comment f
(1986) (emphasis added).
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argument can, and indeed must, be made that the apparent breadth of the
modifiability language of this portion of the Walters opinion should be inter-
preted, and limited, to stand for nothing more than the principle in the cases the
court cited: that even final judgments may, under certain restricted circum-
stances, be subject to reopening, setting aside, or further orders for
implementation.109
Significantly, the language of Walters itself also may be interpreted to sup-
port the conclusion that property divisions remain nonmodiflable. It is impor-
tant to note that in the crucial part of the opinion in which the court sets forth
what will henceforth be the rule in North Carolina, 110 the court speaks solely in
terms of "separation agreements." As noted previously, although it is function-
ally unrealistic, and often impossible, to distinguish between a "separation agree-
ment" and a "property division," the technical distinction between the two
remains viable, particularly in North Carolina case law. 111 It is thus plausible to
suggest that the court's statement that "[a]l separation agreements approved...
as judgments of the court ... are modifiable""12 refers only to the technical
definition of a separation agreement."13 Such a narrow, but by no means unu-
sual,11 4 interpretation of the term "separation agreement" would clearly pre-
serve the traditional rule that property settlements are nonmodiflable.
Finally, but perhaps most critically, a judicial rule that unexecuted portions
of a property division are modifiable would appear to contravene the spirit, if not
also the letter, of the Equitable Distribution of Property Act. 1 5 It seems clear,
in the first instance, that the Act itself contemplates that judicially imposed divi-
sions of property are nonmodifiable, regardless of whether the court orders a
contemporaneous distribution or a distributive award payable over time.
1 16
109. See supra notes 106-08; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 comment b
(1980) (Final judgment "represents the completion of all steps in the adjudication of the claim by the
court, short of any steps by way of execution or enforcement that may be consequent upon the
particular kind of adjudication.").
110. See supra text accompanying note 78.
111. See supra notes 2, 36 and accompanying texts; Stanley v. Cox, 253 N.C. 620, 624, 117
S.E.2d 826, 832 (1960); Britt v. Britt, 36 N.C. App. 705, 711, 245 S.E.2d 381, 385 (1978); 2 R. LEE,
supra note 10, at 461; Sharp, supra note 2, at 826-27 n.38. See also infra text accompanying notes
269-81 (discussing the highly technical distinction the court of appeals has begun to draw between
separation and property agreements).
112. Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 386, 298 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1983).
113. See supra note 45.
114. See H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 756. Professor Clark soundly disapproves of such distinc-
tions precisely because of the confusion they engender. See infra notes 241-42 and accompanying
text.
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20 to -21 (1987).
116. Several provisions of the statute strongly imply this conclusion when property distribution
is the product of litigation. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(3) (dealing with distribution of
pension benefits, and specifically providing that any "unpaid balance" of a distributive award to a
payee shall pass by will or intestacy in the event of the death of the payee); id. § 50-20(e) (providing
for a "distributive award payable over a period of time" whenever an equitable distribution of prop-
erty in kind would be "impractical"); id. § 50-206) (requiring a court to make written findings of fact
that marital property was equitably divided). The statute further makes specific provision for modi-
fication of alimony or child support awards after, and in view of, the property division. Id. § 50-




Furthermore, there is no indication in the Act that private agreements for the
distribution of property should be accorded different treatment whether or not
submitted for court approval.1 17 To the contrary, North Carolina General Stat-
ute section 50-20(d) provides that "parties may by written agreement... pro-
vide for distribution of the marital property in a manner deemed by the parties
to be equitable and the agreement shall be binding on the parties."
' 118
An agreement that is binding on the parties need not, of course, be binding
on the court. Indeed, in the great majority of states the requirement of judicial
approval of agreements presupposes the power of courts to reject, or even mod-
ify, contracts presented to them for merger, incorporation, or approval at the
time of divorce.' 19 This power to disapprove, reject, or in some fashion act upon
an agreement at the time it is submitted to the court in the final divorce proceed-
ing, however, is entirely distinct from the issue of modification of an agreement
after it has been approved, merged, or incorporated.1 20 As noted previously,
once a court has acted upon an agreement in its final decree, the property
division provisions thereof are, almost without exception, held to be
nonmodifiable.
12 1
The alternative proposition, that "unsatisfied" portions of merged property
divisions are now automatically subject to judicial modification, 122 amounts to
nothing less than a complete reversal of fundamental principles of law, and to a
virtual renunciation of res judicata principles in domestic consent judgments. 123
The latter outcome would, among other things, have the effect that court or-
dered/approved property divisions would not be entitled to full faith and credit
in sister states.124 It is difficult to imagine that the Supreme Court of North
117. The Act does provide that a consent judgment for equitable distribution "may be entered at
any time during the pendency of the action" - L e., prior to a decree of absolute divorce. Id. § 50-
21(a). If anything, however, this provision encourages the private settlement of property rights, a
position consistent with long-standing public policy.
118. Id. § 50-20(d).
119. See cases and statutes cited supra at note 14. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
provides that if an agreement is found to be unconscionable, the court "may request the parties to
submit a revised separation agreement or may make orders for the disposition of property, mainte-
nance, and support." UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 306(c), 9A U.L.A. 216 (1987).
120. Although there is clearly no statutory requirement for judicial review of settlement agree-
ments in North Carolina, at least one case has suggested in dictum that a court has the authority to
refuse to incorporate if it finds that "incorporation would be inequitable." Cavenaugh v. Cavenaugh,
317 N.C. 652, 660 n.1, 347 S.E.2d 19, 24 n.1 (1986).
121. See supra note 102.
122. A further indication that the court did not intend to create such a sweeping change in
North Carolina law is that it gave no indication whatsoever of what circumstances might justify a
modification of "unsatisfied" portions of a property division. The introduction of such a radically
new principle without the inclusion of guidelines for its application would be unusual indeed.
123. See, eg., Taysom v. Taysom, 82 Idaho 58, 62-63, 849 P.2d 556, 559 (1960) (issue of validity
of an agreement not res judicata in subsequent action where court had not approved property divi-
sion); Gardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681, 694, 230 S.W.2d 731, 738 (1950) (no res judicata effect where
wife sought to set aside property settlement agreement because validity of contract was never passed
on by rendering court); Delp v. Schiel, 223 Or. 267, 274, 354 P.2d 299, 303 (1960) (divorce decree
did not approve or confirm parties' agreement, thus subsequent action to determine property rights
was not barred).
124. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 929 (1982), where the authors point out that
although some courts may choose to recognize nonfinal judgments, "it is generally assumed that
recognition, in the interstate setting, is constitutionally required only for final decrees and judg-
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Carolina intended property settlement decrees of this state to have such a fragile
status in other states.
Finally, modification of property divisions would also create utter havoc in
the settlement process.' 25 Parties are highly unlikely to enter into contracts that
can be modified without their consent. The effect would almost certainly be a
geometric increase in litigation in the already overburdened district courts, 126 a
result the supreme court cannot be deemed to have intended.
In summary, there are several rationales under which it may be possible to
argue with some cogency that merged property divisions in North Carolina re-
main nonmodifiable. First, it seems reasonable to suggest that the Walters
court's description of the law to encompass modification of unexecuted portions
of property divisions should be limited to the narrow principles represented by
the very cases cited by the supreme court-that even final judgments may be
subject to various motions to set aside, reopen, vacate, or amend. 127 Second,
that portion of the opinion abolishing the "mere approval" option and holding
that henceforth "every court approved separation agreement" 128 should be con-
sidered a judgment and thus modifiable, should be interpreted to exclude prop-
erty divisions, since provisions involving property are not technically separation
agreements. Third, allowing modification of unexecuted property divisions con-
travenes legislative intentions implicit in the Equitable Distribution of Property
Act. Fourth, the failure of the supreme court to overrule, or even mention, the
imposing body of case law holding property divisions to be nonmodifiable1 29
may itself indicate an absence of intent to disturb such a fundamental principle
of domestic law.
Finally, a common-sense appreciation of the divorce bargaining process13 0
creates a strong argument for retention of the traditional rules in this area. The
most fundamental and far-reaching analytical problem in Walters is the highly
merits." Id. The rationale for this rule is that "a judgment will not be given greater effect in the
recognizing than in the rendering state." Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 107 (1971) (stating same rule). Scoles and Hay go on to discuss the multitude of problems
caused by the nonfinal nature of support and alimony decrees, but no section of their treatise deals
with modification of property divisions because such are deemed nonmodifiable under the laws of
virtually all states.
125. A distributive award of marital property in a judicial decree, under the provisions of N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (c) (1987), for example, would be fraught with the danger of modification for
the spouse receiving a property division via installment payments. The "contract only" option,
moreover, while it may make settlements less vulnerable to "modification" (see supra note 90) is
clearly unacceptable when a division of pension rights is delayed, since a Qualified Domestic Rela-
tions Order clearly requires an order. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3) (West Supp. 1990). The "con-
tract only" option creates many other problems as well. See infra text accompanying notes 201-12.
126. In 1988, for example, there were 32,396 divorces in North Carolina. N.C. DIv. OF STATIs-
TICS AND INFORMATION SERV., DIVORCE, 1987-1988 (1990). Actual divorces, of course, constitute
only the tip of the iceberg of district courts' overall domestic caseload.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 104-09.
128. Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 386, 298 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1983) (emphasis added).
129. See cases cited supra, at note 102. It should also be noted that Walters specifically over-
ruled only the option of a "mere approval" consent judgment in Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 69, 136
S.E.2d 240, 242 (1964). More vaguely, Walters overruled Bunn "insofar as" it was in conflict with
the "new rule" abolishing the dual system of consent judgments. Walters, 307 N.C. at 386, 298
S.E.2d at 342.
130. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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technical, and equally unrealistic, distinction between separation and property
division agreements, a distinction that it is necessary to interpret Walters as hav-
ing drawn if the finality of property divisions is to be preserved. As the authors
of one of the most significant articles on domestic law in the past two decades
have forcefully pointed out, however, there are only two items of value on the
divorce bargaining table: money and children.131 "Money" includes child sup-
port, true alimony, periodic payments of property divisions structured as ali-
mony, periodic payments of money not structured as alimony, and in kind
transfers of property. As unpalatable as the bald statement of the prospect may
be, parties do in fact, and with great frequency, "trade" money for custody.
132
Virtually all full divorce settlements of marital rights involve a commin-
gling of property, support, and custodial rights that are, at a practical level,
impossible to separate. 133 Any attempt to do so-i e., to draw a bright line be-
tween one part of the bargain and another, and to apply different rules to each-
thus ignores the realities of the bargaining process, and the ultimate bargain
itself.
C. The Integrated Agreement Principle
If unexecuted property division provisions of settlement agreements submit-
ted for judicial approval remain nonmodifiable, then not only does the most
formidable obstacle to the freedom of parties to submit their agreements to a
court disappear,134 but any doubt about the post-Walters validity of the integra-
tion principle would also dissipate. 135 To restate the obvious, the issue of the
principle of the nonmodiflability of an unsatisfied property division is analyti-
cally almost identical to the issue of the nonmodiflability of integrated agree-
ment provisions labeled "alimony," because such "alimony" provisions are in
fact part of a property settlement. 136 The two principles involved, however, are
not identical, despite their shared analytical base. The proposition that property
division settlements are nonmodiflable is analytically prerequisite to the integra-
tion principle, but the latter is an extension of the former. In addition, not all
property divisions are part of an integrated agreement. Thus it is also necessary
to reexamine the integrated agreement concept in the aftermath of Walters.
It is clear that the decision in Walters swept so broadly that it could well
have been interpreted to have overruled the reciprocal consideration/integration
principle. 137 Indeed, it seems that some practitioners and courts have done just
131. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 963 (discussing use of threats to sue for custody as
a bargaining tool).
132. Id. at 964; see also Sharp, supra note 9, at 1437-38 (custody threats may be made for sole
purpose of coercing unfair settlement).
133. See H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 756, 785.
134. The desirability of preserving court approval for private agreements as an attractive option
will be discussed in the next section of this Article.
135. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text; see also Marks v. Marks, 316 N.C. 447,454,
342 S.E.2d 859, 864 (1986), discussed infra, at notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. It bears noting that allowing modification of
property divisions would render the integration principle virtually meaningless.
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that: they have assumed that the integrated agreement principle met the same
fate as the Type I consent judgment. 138 This conclusion is certainly precipitous,
however, and in all likelihood erroneous.
Walters clearly did overrule Bunn v. Bunn,139 to the extent that it was "in
conflict" with its decision. 14° That statement, however, bears close examination.
The only portions of Bunn that are incontrovertibly inconsistent with the Wal-
ters holding are those parts dealing with Type I consent judgments, in which,
under pre-Walters law, alimony provisions were nonmodifiable without regard
to their relationship to any property division.1 4 1 The integration/modification
issue arose, and continues to arise, only with court ordered judgments--i.e., the
Type II consent judgments, expanded by Walters to include agreements that are
"merely approved" by a court. 142 As previously explained, the distinguishing
features of these Type II consent judgments were: 1) that the support provisions
thereof were directly enforceable, as a court order, by contempt; 2) that the
alimony provisions were, as court orders, also modifiable; 143 unless 3) the "ali-
mony" provisions were found to be part of an integrated settlement, in which
case those provisions, like the property division for which they furnished the
consideration, would be nonmodifiable absent the consent of both parties. 144
Without mention of this third well-established attribute of a court-adopted
consent judgment Walters did go on to state, quite broadly, that such "court
ordered separation agreements, as consent judgments, are modifiable, and en-
forceable by the contempt powers of the court."' 145 And therein lies the prob-
lem, or, more accurately, two problems. First, as noted previously, the meaning
of the term "separation agreement" has been, and continues to be, the subject of
considerable confusion. 146 Especially in North Carolina the term has sometimes
been defined so technically as to constitute a virtual term of art-that is, to refer
to an instrument that provides solely for support. 147 Such an agreement,
although a rarity in practice, would indeed constitute true alimony, modifiable
and enforceable by contempt once adopted by a court. In this purely technical
138. See, eg., Cecil v. Cecil, 74 N.C. App. 455,456, 328 S.E.2d 899, 900 (1985); Acosta v. Clark,
70 N.C. App. 111, 115, 318 S.E.2d 551, 554 (1984). In each case the court dealt with the integration
issue, but it clearly implied that it was dealing with an area of the law that had been changed by
Walters. For a discussion of the ways in which practitioners have dealt with the uncertainties in this
area since 1983, see infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
140. Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 386, 298 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1983).
141. Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 70, 136 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1964) overruled in part by Walters v.
Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 386, 298 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1983).
142. Walters, 307 N.C. at 386, 298 S.E.2d at 342.
143. As Justice Exum noted in his dissent in Walters, modifiability is an "inherent attribute" of
true alimony. Id. at 391, 298 S.E.2d at 344 (Exum, J., dissenting).
144. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. The fourth distinguishing feature of this
kind of consent judgment involves its establishment of res judicata consequences, an issue discussed
supra at notes 108-09.
145. Walters, 307 N.C. at 386, 298 S.E.2d at 342 (emphasis added).
146. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
147. See 2 R. LEE, supra note 10, § 188, at 462. Provisions concerning custody and child sup-
port are also considered to fall within this technical definition of a separation agreement. For a
further example of North Carolina courts' narrow interpretation of such agreements, see infra note
271 and accompanying text.
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and theoretical sense, however, a "separation agreement" could not encompass
an agreement that also provided for property division, including installment or
periodic payments labeled as "alimony." Although in a later portion of this
Article 143 I will argue strenuously against the continued use of the term "separa-
tion agreement" in such a limited and highly technical manner, a persuasive
argument can be made that Walters should be interpreted to have used the term
in precisely this fashion.
The second problem raised by the "court ordered separation agreements...
are modifiable" language, 149 involves the always delicate task of interpreting an
omission. It is again important to note that Walters did not, even obliquely,
mention the integrated agreement concept,15° much less specifically overrule it.
Nor did the court in any way refer to White v. White,' 5' the leading case on the
integrated agreement principle. The portions of Bunn v. Bunn,'152 and the opin-
ion in Levitch v. Levitch' 53 that Walters did overrule dealt only with the require-
ments necessary to create a merged agreement, and with the distinction between
Type I and Type II consent judgments. Walters clearly eliminated the distinc-
tion between adopted and approved consent judgments; it should not, and need
not, be interpreted by implication only to have gone further and abolished the
integration concept' --to have, in effect, thrown out the baby with the
bathwater.
Given the broad literal language of Walters and its potentially explosive
impact, it is striking to find that in the eight years since the decision there have
been almost no appellate cases that could be interpreted as contradicting this
admittedly restrained and technical interpretation of Walters.'55 At a mini-
148. See infra notes 293-96 and accompanying text.
149. Walters, 307 N.C. at 386, 298 S.E.2d at 342.
150. In reciting the history of the case before it, the court noted that the court of appeals had
found the alimony provision in question to be part of an integrated agreement, id, at 384, 298 S.E.2d
at 340-41, but did not mention the concept in the body of its opinion. In his forceful dissent, how-
ever, Justice Exum did apparently assume that the majority had overruled this principle. Id. at 391,
298 S.E.2d at 345 (Exum, J., dissenting). The entire point of this discussion, however, is that
although this conclusion could be correct, it certainly need not be.
151. 296 N.C. 661, 252 S.E.2d 698 (1979), discussed supra at notes 71-74.
152. 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964), overruled in part by Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381,
386, 298 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1983).
153. 294 N.C. 437, 241 S.E.2d 506 (1978), overruled by Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 386,
298 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1983); see discussion supra at notes 58-59.
154. Justice Exum did assume that the court had gone much further indeed. Walters, 307 N.C.
at 387-92, 298 S.E.2d at 342-45 (Exum, J., dissenting). Even he, however, was somewhat uncertain
as to the effect of the majority's opinion: "[a]pparently the majority's position is ...." Id. at 388,
298 S.E.2d at 343 (Exun, J., dissenting). He also noted that, "On the one hand the opinion quotes
and cites Bunn approvingly, but then indicates that some portions of Bunn and Levitch v. Levitch ...
may be inconsistent with the decision and are overruled." Id. (Exum, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
155. The only possible exception to this observation is Voshell v. Voshell, 68 N.C. App. 733, 315
S.E.2d 763 (1984). Upon close scrutiny, however, Voshell may not be the exception that it would
otherwise appear to be. The case involved a 1981 separation agreement which had provided that the
marital home would be sold and the proceeds therefrom divided equally between the parties. Id. at
734, 315 S.E.2d at 764. At the time of the final divorce hearing a year later, the house had not been
sold, and the district court judge ordered the husband to pay the wife $5,000-a sum that repre-
sented her estimated equity in the house-and then incorporated the modified agreement into the
final order. The court of appeals held that the lower court was without authority to order the
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mum, it appears almost as if the courts, perhaps having sobering second
thoughts about the implications of a literal interpretation of the Walters deci-
sion, have sought to avoid direct confrontation with principles of nonmodiflable
property divisions and integrated agreements.
15 6
At the supreme court, moreover, there appears to be more than a simple
judicial reluctance to deal directly with the Walters threat to these established
principles. Several decisions from that court seem to reflect a subtle effort to
distance itself from such an interpretation of Walters. Indeed, in Henderson v.
Henderson,15 7 a companion case published the same day as Walters, the supreme
court dealt with the integration principle in a manner that gave no suggestion
that there had been any change in existing law. In two other cases the supreme
court also had ample opportunity, which it deftly declined, to affirm or clarify
the principles left in doubt by Walters.158 Each case dealt with the issue of the
modifiability of what were clearly support provisions of agreements incorporated
into decrees. In each instance the supreme court cited Walters merely for the
proposition that "separation agreements" incorporated or approved by the dis-
trict court were modifiable.15 9 Both opinions, therefore, support an interpreta-
payment of $5,000 in exchange for the wife's equity in the home because it could not modify the
contract between the parties. It went on to note that, because the agreement had now been incorpo-
rated into the court order, "if the property still has not been sold, the arrangements in regard to it
can properly be reconsidered by the trial court." Id. at 737, 315 S.E.2d at 766. It is possible, of
course, to view this authorization of "reconsideration" by the trial court as authorization to modify
the incorporated agreement of the parties. It is equally possible to view such "reconsideration"
merely as an extension of the court's power to implement its previous order, a view that would be
consistent with the earlier interpretation of Walters to allow well established, but carefully restricted,
motions to implement, set aside, or otherwise affect final orders. See supra notes 105-09 and accom-
panying text.
156. It should be noted that no case has directly held that unexecuted property divisions are
subject to judicial modification, and even the somewhat ambiguous Voshell case, discussed supra at
note 155, has not been cited in any subsequent opinion.
157. In Henderson v. Henderson, 307 N.C. 401, 298 S.E.2d 345 (1983), the supreme court dealt
with the issue of whether an integrated agreement alimony provision could be enforced by contempt.
The court held that the nature of the payments as "alimony" or as part of an "integrated settlement"
was not determinative of their enforceability by contempt. Id. at 406, 298 S.E.2d at 349. The exist-
ence of a court order, the court concluded, meant that the provisions were enforceable by contempt
in either event. Id. at 406-08, 298 S.E.2d at 349-50. But it is worth pointing out that the court gave
no indication that the integration principle had been in any way affected by its decision in Walters.
Indeed, if anything, the court appeared rather carefully to sidestep Walters. Thus, it noted at one
point that "we have purposely not... [dealt with] the provisions of the judgment relating to the
periodic payments for the support of the wife because the nature of those payments as 'alimony' or as
part of an 'integrated settlement' or their 'modifiability' or 'nonmodifiability' does not affect their
enforceability by contempt." Id. at 406, 298 S.E.2d at 349.
158. Cavenaugh v. Cavenaugh, 317 N.C. 652, 347 S.E.2d 19 (1986); Doub v. Doub, 68 N.C.
App. 718, 315 S.E.2d 732 (1984), aff'd as modified, 313 N.C. 169, 326 S.E.2d 259 (1985).
159. Doub involved a contract action to enforce the alimony provisions of a 1978 separation
agreement that had been incorporated by reference in the 1978 divorce decree. The court of appeals,
noting that Walters did not govern the case, held that the alimony was nonmodifiable because it fell
within the "exception" of the reciprocal consideration principle. Doub v. Doub, 68 N.C. App. 718,
719, 315 S.E.2d 732, 733-34 (1984), aff'd as modified, 313 N.C. 169, 326 S.E.2d 359 (1985). It went
on to observe that even if Walters were applicable, the "plaintiff has elected to sue defendant for
breach of contract instead of invoking the contempt powers of the court to enforce the court ordered
separation agreement. We do not read Walters as depriving plaintiff of the option of electing to sue
for breach of contract." Id. at 720, 315 S.E.2d at 734. It was this quoted language that the supreme
court, on discretionary review, expressly "disapprov[ed]" and "disavowe[d]." Doub v. Doub, 313
N.C. 169, 170, 326 S.E.2d 259, 260 (1985) (emphasis added). It then repeated the holding of Walters
that all "separation agreements" approved by a court are court judgments and modifiable as such and
[Vol. 69
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
tion of Walters that centers on the highly technical and restricted definition of
"'separation agreements" to encompass agreements for support alone. 16°
By far the most critical opinion supporting this limited interpretation of
Walters, and affirming the continued validity of the integration agreement prin-
ciple (and by necessary implication the nonmodifiability of property divisions),
however, is Marks v. Marks,16 1 a case that has received very little notice, but
that warrants close attention.162
The court of appeals in Marks addressed the familiar issue of whether the
alimony provisions of an agreement that had been incorporated by reference into
a 1974 divorce decree were part of an integrated agreement or were subject to
modification. 163 The court determined that the provision in question was part of
an integrated agreement, that it thus fell within the "exception" of White v.
White,164 and therefore was not subject to judicial modification.
165
On appeal, the supreme court undertook an extremely detailed analysis and
explication of North Carolina alimony rules, beginning with a statement of the
principle that there are two requirements for true alimony.16 6 The first require-
ment, which is both statutory and jurisdictional, is that there must be a "court
then cautioned that the "parties to a consent judgment controlled by Walters do not have an election
to enforce such judgment by contempt or to proceed in an independent action in contract." Id. at
171, 326 S.E.2d at 260-61. Thus Doub reaffirmed the new "either/or rule" announced in Walters:
either a "separation agreement" is a contract, enforceable only by independent action, or it is a court
order, enforceable only by an action on the judgment. The court did not address the issue of
whether the alimony provisions of a court-ordered integrated agreement were modifiable.
In Cavenaugh v. Cavenaugh, 317 N.C. 652, 347 S.E.2d 19 (1986), the parties had entered into a
separation agreement in 1981, under which the defendant husband was to pay plaintiff certain sums
of money each month. Although he paid child support and a monthly debt to a creditor, he was
some $3,210.00 in arrears on "payment in lieu of alimony" and mortgage payments at the time of the
final hearing. Id. at 655, 347 S.E.2d at 21. The lower court ordered specific performance of the
arrearages, without a finding of fact that the defendant's failure to pay had been willful, and thus was
overruled on that issue by the supreme court. Id. at 660, 347 S.E.2d at 25. Of greater relevance to
the present discussion, however, is the fact that the supreme court cited Walters basically only for
the proposition that a "separation agreement" incorporated into a divorce judgment becomes "an
order of the court subject to modification." Id. at 659, 347 S.E.2d at 24. The court cited Vaughan v.
Vaughan, 211 N.C. 354, 361, 190 S.E.2d 492, 496 (1937), and 2 R. LEE, supra note 10, § 158, for the
same proposition, noting that as a judgment of the court, the separation agreement could be enforced
by execution. Cavenaugh, 317 N.C. at 660, 347 S.E.2d at 25. This grouping of Walters with older
sources holding merely that true alimony is modifiable and enforceable by contempt or execution
may or may not be of significance. It is, however, consistent with the restricted interpretation of
Walters suggested in this Article.
160. Doub, 313 N.C. at 171, 326 S.E.2d at 260-61; Cavenaugh, 317 N.C. at 659, 347 S.E.2d at
24.
161. 316 N.C. 447, 342 S.E.2d 859 (1986).
162. See infra note 170 for an explanation of why Marks has undesetvingly received little
attention.
163. Marks, 316 N.C. at 448-49, 342 S.E.2d at 860-61.
164. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
165. Marks, 316 N.C. at 455, 342 S.E.2d at 864. The use of the term "exception" to refer to
integrated periodic payments that were not subject to modification refers, of course, to the general
principle that true alimony is always modifiable. The Marks court admonished the court of appeals
for its "exception" language because such payments are not an "exception" to alimony rules: they
simply are not alimony. Id. The use of the term "exception" does betray a lack of full understand-
ing that such periodic payments are a property division. Thus, the issue is more than semantic. In
previous decisions, moreover, the supreme court itself had referred to integrated alimony provisions
as an "exception." See, eg., Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 184, 287 S.E.2d 840, 844 (1982).
166. Marks, 316 N.C. at 455, 342 S.E.2d at 864; see also Bunn v. Bums, 262 N.C. 67, 70, 136
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order" for alimony.167 It was in the context of its discussion of this requirement
that the supreme court set forth its own interpretation of Walters - an interpre-
tation that is succinct, restrained, and wholly consistent with this Article's previ-
ous analysis. Walters, explained the Marks court, had merely simplified the
problem of determining when the necessary court order existed. It had abolished
the previous "bifurcated view of consent judgments and thus prospectively alle-
viated the complex analysis previously required by Bunn and its progeny in de-
termining whether the first element ('court order' confers jurisdiction) of
N.C.G.S. § 50-16.9(a) has been met." 168
The court then discussed the second requirement for alimony 169-a discus-
sion notable for its lack of any mention of Walters, or for any indication whatso-
ever that Walters had in any way affected this second prong of the alimony
test.170 In addition to being part of a court order, the court stated, a support
payment must constitute "true alimony" in order to be modifiable. 171 The court
then explained that:
Support provisions, although denominated as 'alimony,' do not consti-
tute true alimony within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 50-16.9(a) if they
actually are part of an integrated property settlement. The test for
determining if an agreement is an integrated property settlement is
whether the support provisions for the dependent spouse "and other
provisions for a property division between the parties constitute recip-
rocal consideration for each other."
172
Then, in a statement that strongly supports the limited and technical interpreta-
tion of Walters suggested earlier, the court explained that:
[T]he rule that support provisions in an integrated property settlement
are not 'alimony' and are not modifiable is not an 'exception' to any
rule. It is merely a definitional method of determining whether the
second element of N.C.G.S. § 50-16.9(a) has been met, that is, whether
the provisions sought to be modified are true alimony ... or are, in
S.E.2d 240, 243 (1964) (discussing same principles of reciprocal consideration), overruled in part by
Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 386, 298 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1983).
167. Marks, 316 N.C. at 452, 342 S.E.2d at 862. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a) (1987) provides
that: "An order of a court of this State for alimony... whether contested or entered by consent,
may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed
circumstances."
168. Marks, 316 N.C. at 452, 342 S.E.2d at 862.
169. Id. at 454, 342 S.E.2d at 864.
170. It is very important to note that just prior to the discussion of the first requirement for true
alimony, the court cautioned that its opinion would be of "limited public interest," because it in-
volved pre- Walters law. Id. at 451, 342 S.E.2d at 861. The only part of the Marks opinion, however,
in which Walters was cited as having changed the law was in the court's discussion of what consti-
tuted a "court order." Id. at 452, 342 S.E.2d at 862. The remainder of the opinion, as discussed
infra, dealing with the second requirement for technical alimony, does not contain so much as a hint
that the discussion or outcome would have been different had Walters been applicable. Indeed, the
remainder of the opinion can only be interpreted as a discussion of current, not previous, North
Carolina law. Thus, despite the court's own caveat, it appears both possible and reasonable to view
Marks as an attempt to reaffirm and clarify what Walters had left in doubt-the continued viability
of the two-pronged test for technical alimony.
171. Id. at 454, 342 S.E.2d at 864.
172. Id. at 454-55, 342 S.E.2d at 864 (emphasis added) (quoting White v. White, 296 N.C. 661,
666, 252 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1979)).
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fact, something else. If support provisions are found to be considera-
tion for, and inseparable from, property settlement provisions, the sup-
port provisions, even if contained in a court-ordered consent judgment,
are not alimony but instead are merely a part of an integrated property
settlement which is not modifiable by the courts.
173
At the risk of belaboring the point, it is difficult not to attach significance to
the fact that the Marks court carefully specified that Waiters had indeed
changed the first prong of the "true alimony" test-what constitutes a court
order. It is equally difficult to avoid the conclusion that the court's failure to so
much as hint that Walters had in any way changed the second prong of the "true
alimony" requirement, its lengthy and painstaking explanation of that require-
ment (including the integrated agreement principle), its consistent use of the
present tense, and its reliance upon White v. White, all indicate that the principle
of nonmodifiability of integrated agreements, specifically property divisions, re-
mains the law in North Carolina.
In summary, it seems possible, if not necessary, to interpret Walters as fol-
lows. First, the case stands for the already established proposition that unsatis-
fied portions of property division agreements may be subject to motions to
implement, vacate, amend, or set aside, but not to a general judicial power to
modify. This analysis is consistent with existing principles, with legislative in-
tent in the enactment of the Equitable Distribution of Property Act, with the
finality requirement for court judgments, and with important public policy con-
cerns of the state. Second, the opinion should be interpreted to be premised
upon the highly technical definition of "separation agreement" that equates only
with support agreements, so that true alimony remains modifiable, whereas peri-
odic payments that are in reality property divisions remain nonmodifiable. This
analysis is consistent with well-established precedent, with existing domestic law
principles, and with standard contract law. Third, as Marks definitively stated,
Walters obviously stands for the proposition that Type I consent judgments have
been judicially abolished in North Carolina. Unfortunately, acceptance of the
first and second propositions does not, and cannot, compensate for the damage
caused by the elimination of the "mere approval" option and the creation of a
"contract only" option for settlement agreements.
III. THE AFTERMATH OF Walters
4. Contract Only - Analysis
Consent judgments are a viable vehicle for the settlement of the distribu-
tional consequences of divorce only so long as two conditions are~met. First, the
rules governing the creation of such judgments must be clear. Second, the effect
of these judgments must also be clear, and must recognize not only the principle
that property divisions remain nonmodiflable after incorporation into, or ap-
173. Id. at 455, 342 S.E.2d at 864. See supra note 165 for a discussion of the significance of
eliminating the concept of integrated periodic payments as an "exception" to alimony rules.
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proval by, a court; but also the corollary concept of integrated agreements. 174
Walters certainly accomplished the first of these prerequisites by providing that
all settlement agreements submitted to the court for approval or incorporation
will become court judgments.
175
With regard to the second requirement, however, Walters raised more ques-
tions than it answered. The most critical of these issues, whether property divi-
sion portions of approved settlement agreements remain immune from judicial
modification, has been virtually avoided in the years since that decision. The
analysis and argument set forth in the previous section of this Article that these
provisions do remain nonmodiflable, however, does not negate the need for a
judicial or legislative pronouncement to that effect.17 6 And until that question is
answered definitively,177 parties, or at least parties with knowledgeable lawyers,
will continue to avbid the use of consent judgments to embody settlement agree-
ments that contain provision for periodic or installment payments for property
divisions.178 Indeed, even the possibility that a meticulously negotiated settle-
ment bargain could be destroyed by judicial modification, at potentially great
prejudice to one party, is sufficient effectively to eliminate use of a consent judg-
ment as an option.
179
174. True alimony remains modifiable, of course-a principle to which the public policy of
North Carolina is firmly devoted. See, eg., Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 183-84, 287 S.E.2d 840,
844 (1982); Frykberg v. Frykberg, 76 N.C. App. 401, 410, 333 S.E.2d 766, 772 (1985); Acosta v.
Clark, 70 N.C. App. 111, 113-14, 318 S.E.2d 551, 553 (1984).
175. Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 386, 298 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1983).
176. As noted previously, Marks v. Marks, 316 N.C. 447, 342 S.E.2d 859 (1986), might well be
interpreted as just such a judicial statement of this principle. For reasons discussed supra at note
170, however, that opinion has received far less attention than it deserves.
177. One very recent decision from the court of appeals has taken an extremely important step in
providing that answer. In Hayes v. Hayes, 100 N.C. App. 138, 394 S.E.2d 675 (1990), the parties
entered into a modification of a consent judgment that provided for "alimony" payments to the wife
for a period of five years. She remarried shortly after the judgment was entered, and husband ceased
making alimony payments. The lower court found that the payments were intended to be reciprocal
consideration for a property division and that the payments did not terminate upon wife's remar-
riage. Id. at 145, 394 S.E.2d at 679. The court of appeals remanded for an evidentiary hearing on
the issue of the parties' intent regarding the integrated nature of the agreement. Id. at 147, 394
S.E.2d at 680. In unmistakable language, however, the court of appeals ruled that Walters had not
overruled the principle of reciprocal consideration and affirmed the traditional rule in this area. Id.
at 146-47, 394 S.E.2d at 679. Although this issue still needs to be addressed directly by the supreme
court, the Hayes opinion is a critical step in the right direction.
178. Among the many problems created by Walters are potential pitfalls for lawyers who are less
than expert in this increasingly complex area of the law. See also supra notes 221-26 and accompa-
nying text (discussion of the ways in which practitioners have dealt with the uncertainties in this
area since 1983).
179. By way of common example, in a sizeable number of divorces there are insufficient ready
assets to effectuate a complete property settlement at the time of the divorce or agreement. This is
particularly true where one spouse has substantial pension benefits or owns a business or corporation
for which a division in kind would be impractical. In such instances, distributive awards-i.e., peri-
odic payments (which may or may not be labeled "alimony") that one spouse agrees to make to the
other, in return for which the other spouse agrees to waive all other "rights arising out of the mar-
riage"-are the only means by which a property settlement can be concluded. These waivers consti-
tute the consideration for the periodic payments. They are, moreover, fully performed at the
moment of execution, and have been broadly and strictly interpreted in North Carolina. See, e.g.,
Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 288, 354 S.E.2d 228, 231 (1987) (interpreting release of all rights to
"all property now owned by the 'husband'" as a full waiver of equitable distribution); Morris v.
Morris, 79 N.C. App. 386, 391-92, 339 S.E.2d 424,427-28 (1986) (interpreting general waiver clause
to include waiver of rights to military retirement benefits of spouse despite the fact that statutory
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The Walters court saw no harm in this. Indeed, Walters, along with several
other appellate decisions, can only be interpreted not only to have encouraged
use of the "contract only" option, but to have actively discouraged use of the
courts to approve or incorporate private agreements. 180 This lack of apprecia-
tion of the function of judicial review is in itself remarkable. But Walters itself
implicitly rests upon the assumption that a settlement agreement is no different
from any other contract,181 and rests explicitly upon the complementary as-
sumptions that "contract only" resolution is both less complicated than court
approval and more than adequate to meet the needs of the parties.'
8 2
All of these assumptions are seriously flawed, however, at both practical
and policy levels. First, it is worth repeating that the state has strong and legiti-
mate policy interests in settlement agreements that differ markedly from its in-
terests in most other private contracts. In general, the state has an interest in
protecting all citizens from bargaining contexts which are peculiarly conducive
to overreaching tactics.' 8 3 Specifically, the state has a very real interest in the
creation of some procedures by which it can ensure that settlement agreements
make adequate provision for children and dependent spouses.
18 4 It is important
to emphasize that this state interest is not "triggered" by a decision to seek court
approval of an agreement. The policy interests of the state are no less imperative
simply because the agreement has been withheld from judicial scrutiny.18 5
rights to such benefits did not exist at time agreement was signed), rev. denied, 316 N.C. 733, 345
S.E.2d 390 (1986); McArthur v. McArthur, 68 N.C. App. 484, 486, 315 S.E.2d 344, 345 (1984)
(general waiver clause effective to bar all rights to substantial properties not mentioned in agree-
ment). The waiving party will have thus fully, and irrevocably, performed his or her half of the
bargain, whereas under the "worst case" interpretation of Walters, the other party might be able to
secure judicial modification of his or her half of the bargain.
180. In one noteworthy case, for example, the court of appeals commented that agreements
which had been "merely approved" (a Type I consent judgment) "serve no useful purpose and have
been a source of litigation giving rise to unforeseen consequences in the form of numerous excep-
tions." Henderson v. Henderson, 55 N.C. App. 506, 510, 286 S.E.2d 657, 661 (1982), aff'd, 307
N.C. 401, 298 S.E.2d 345 (1983). In Acosta v. Clark, 70 N.C. App. 111, 115, 318 S.E.2d 551, 554
(1984), the court, discussing Walters's reaffirmation of a policy in favor of modification of alimony,
observed that "[als justification for this seemingly harsh rule, the Court noted that if the parties wish
to preserve their agreement as a contract they need only avoid submitting their agreement to the
court."
181. See, eg., Cavenaugh v. Cavenaugh, 317 N.C. 652, 657, 347 S.E.2d 19, 22-23 (1986) (" 'A
marital separation agreement is generally subject to the same rules of law with respect to its enforce-
ment as any other contract.'" (quoting Moore v. Moore, 297 N.C. 14, 16, 252 S.E.2d 735, 737
(1979))); Lee v. Lee, 93 N.C. App. 584, 586, 378 S.E.2d 554, 555-56 (1989) (court is "bound by the
rules which apply in interpreting any other contract" in construing a separation agreement); Knight
v. Knight, 76 N.C. App. 395, 398, 333 S.E.2d 331, 333 (1985) (separation agreement today is "like
any other bargained-for exchange").
182. See supra note 90.
183. The "underprivileged consumer" is a classic example of a class of persons whom both fed-
eral and state governments have sought to protect from the often harsh results of traditional contract
principles. Elinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 771 (1969).
184. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
185. It is perhaps appropriate at this point to note several points of inconsistency in the court's
"either/or" approach to settlement agreements. Not only do the interests of the state remain con-
stant without regard to whether an agreement is incorporated or not, but the interests of the parties
in relying on their contract rights remain constant as well. Yet the court creates an unparalleled
freedom to contract in one instance (the "contract only" option), to the potential detriment of the
interests of the state; but it threatens, on the other hand, to limit that very freedom to contract once
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Second, at an analytical level, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that
settlement agreements are in fact different from other types of contracts.186
Standard contract principles are designed to operate within the context of a ra-
tional, competitive market that assumes a relative parity of bargaining strength
between the parties.187 To equate the "market" of settlement agreements, mar-
riage dissolution-a situation virtually always accompanied by extraordinary
stress and rarely accompanied by mutual desires to achieve fair results-with
the paradigmatic "marketplace" in which strangers bargain at arms' length, is
simply to ignore the realities of human nature, the adversarial process, and the
realities of most divorce bargaining.1 18
Indeed, marriage dissolution constitutes an excellent example of the kind of
"imperfect" market in which, as one distinguished commentator has aptly
noted, standard marketplace principles are not only inadequate, but also con-
tribute to both unfairness and inefficiency in results.189 The greater the varia-
tion from the "perfect" competitive marketplace, the greater the inadequacies of
the operation of standard bargaining principles. 190 As the treatment of settle-
ment agreements in the overwhelming number of states amply demonstrates, a
more imperfect "market" for the operation of these principles than divorce may
not exist. 191
Recognition of the essential differences between settlement agreements and
other types of contracts does not obscure the basic fact that such agreements are
contracts, and generally should be subject to the same principles governing the
execution and enforcement of other contracts. It does, however, interject into
the operation of the standard principles certain policy and procedural restric-
tions, notably requirements of judicial review, that are designed to ensure at
least minimal protection for the interests of the state and the parties.
The "contract only" option created by Walters turns a blind eye to these
policy and procedural considerations, and, in effect, encourages parties to ex-
clude the state from playing any role in the substantive, i.e., distributional conse-
quences of divorce. 192 Such a result almost mocks the state's traditional, and
agreements are incorporated (by potential modification of unexecuted property divisions), to the
detriment of the parties' intentions.
1 186. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. In addition, an interesting parallel may be drawn
with federal court abstention from jurisdiction in domestic relations cases. See C. WRIoHT, supra
note 107, at 144. The various factors that have long led federal courts to decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion in domestic cases-the particularly strong interest of the several states, the potential for contin-
uing litigation and court supervision, and the nonfinal nature of decrees involving children-are part
of the same group of factors that make settlement agreements different from other kinds of contracts.
See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
187. For an excellent discussion of this principle, and its weaknesses, see Eisenberg, The Bargain
Pr'nciple and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. Rnv. 741, 799 (1982).
188. Id.
189. As Professor Eisenberg has observed, "a market [that] is less than perfectly competitive
does set the stage for transactions in which the bargain principle loses much or all of its force,
because it is supported by neither fairness nor efficiency." Id.
190. Id.
191. See supra note 14 for a discussion of the judicial review standards for settlement agreements
in most states.
192. See supra note 90.
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legitimate, interest in consequences of divorce. It is also particularly unfortu-
nate at a time when, as a result of equitable distribution, the practice of domestic
law has become exponentially more complex. 193 It is possible to speculate that
it is in part this mushrooming complexity of domestic law that has led courts to
seek to decrease their already nearly overwhelming involvement in domestic
issues. 
194
Any judicial economy purpose that is served in the short run, however, is
more than undermined in the long term. As much of the remainder of this
Article will seek to demonstrate, the "contract only" approach is far from sim-
ple in its application and far from adequate in its operation and effect to meet the
long range nepds of the parties. Indeed, the advantages of the court approval
option can best be illustrated by an examination of the problems that can be, and
in large part already have been, created by use of the pure contract approach.
B. "Contract Only"--Practical Implications
The most obvious, but the least critical, disadvantage of the "contract only"
approach is the lack of contempt as a readily available enforcement mecha-
nism. 195 Although the ultimate availability of specific performance decrees to
enforce contractual obligations is of some solace to ex-spouses of recalcitrant
payors, the requirement that a party demonstrate that his remedies at law are
inadequate remains a very real obstacle. 196 More importantly, orders for spe-
cific performance are clearly subject to judicial modification, 197 so that spouses
with a nonmodifiable contract right to periodic payments may well find them-
selves with modifiable specific performance orders.
198
193. Domestic law has become the most recent area of specialization to be recognized by the
North Carolina State Bar Association.
194. As Professor Eisenberg has aptly observed, however, "an increase in the complexity of some
areas of law may be desirable, if it accurately mirrors the increased complexity of social and eco-
nomic life." Eisenberg, supra note 187, at 801.
195. Doub v. Doub, 313 N.C. 169, 171, 326 S.E.2d 259, 260-61 (1985); Henderson v. Henderson,
307 N.C. 401, 408, 298 S.E.2d 345, 350 (1983); Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 385, 298 S.E.2d
338, 341, (1983).
196. See Cavenaugh v. Cavenaugh, 317 N.C. 652, 658, 347 S.E.2d 19, 23 (1986); Whitaker v.
Earnhardt, 289 N.C. 260, 265, 221 S.E.2d 316, 319-20 (1976). In addition, there must be a finding
that the defendant had the ability to pay. Cavenaugh, 317 N.C. at 658, 347 S.E.2d at 23; Harris v.
Harris, 307 N.C. 684, 688, 300 S.E.2d 369, 373 (1983).
197. The leading case is Harris v. Harris, 307 N.C. 684, 300 S.E.2d 369 (1983). In that case the
plaintiff wife sought and obtained an order of specific performance that husband comply with the
terms of a 1974 separation agreement that was not incorporated into a court order. As per the
agreement, the district court initially ordered that husband pay to wife the equivalent of fifty percent
of his military retirement pay. Id. at 686, 300 S.E.2d at 371. In 1981, however, the court modified
its order of specific performance to require that husband pay a sum equal to twenty percent of his
retirement ay (plus an additional ten percent to be applied to arrearages). Id. Wife appealed,
arguing that the court lacked the power to modify the separation agreement between the parties.
The supreme court agreed with the proposition that the agreement was nonmodifiable, but noted
that it was not the agreement that was modified, but the court's previous order. Id. at 687, 300
S.E.2d at 372. It also observed, "In the exercise of its equitable powers, the court could order
specific performance of all or only part of the contract and could modify its orders from time to time
as equity required." Id. at 688, 300 S.E.2d at 372-73. Plaintiff's contract remedies, however, re-
mained unaffected by any action of the court. Id. at 688, 300 S.E.2d at 373. For further discussion
of the survival of contract rights after court modification, see infra notes 215-16.
198. Under these circumstances, the "advantage" of nonmodifiable periodic payments under a
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A much more serious problem, and one that creates profoundly troubling
policy issues, arises when the res judicata effect of a settlement agreement not
presented to a court for approval or incorporation is brought into question. This
problem is particularly acute when the agreements in question involve child sup-
port and child custody-issues that are always subject to modification.19 9 Thus
the issue is not whether provisions involving children are modifiable; rather, it is
one of what standard will be used for modification, that is, whether res judicata
principles will be applicable or not.
2° °
The North Carolina standard for modification of decree provisions affecting
children is quite typical. An order for support or custody of minor children may
be modified "at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed
circumstances." 20 1 The only relevant changed circumstances are those which
have occurred since the entry of the decree.20 2 Even prior to Walters, however,
the issue of whether or not the changed circumstances standard should apply to
agreement-based settlement provisions involving children had arisen in North
Carolina.203 Indeed, there was an earlier line of cases holding that the standard
should not be applicable to any agreement-based provisions involving chil-
dren.204 There was also a strong line of authority holding that the changed
"contract only" agreement would appear to be illusory. If an order of specific performance is neces-
sary for effective enforcement of such an obligation, and if that order may be modified as equity
warrants (notably inability to pay), any surviving contract rights are likely to be unenforceable as a
practical matter.
199. North Carolina, like most states, strongly embraces the principle that parties may not, by
contract, withdraw their children from the protection of the court. Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C.
App. 231, 234, 346 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1986) ("'It is settled that any separation agreement dealing with
the custody and the support of the children... cannot deprive the court of its inherent as well as
statutory authority to protect the interests of and provide for the welfare' " of minor children. (quot-
ing McKaughn v. McKaughn, 29 N.C. App. 702, 704, 225 S.E.2d 616, 618 (1976))); see also Hershey
v. Hershey, 57 N.C. App. 692, 693-94, 292 S.E.2d 141, 143 (1982) ("[N]o agreement between hus-
band and wife can serve to deprive the courts of their inherent authority to protect the interests of
... minor children.").
200. The application ofres judicata principles, including collateral estoppel issues, in the domes-
tic law involving children results in the application, in all states, of the changed circumstances stan-
dard for modification of provisions affecting children. See Sharp, supra note 3, at 1266.
201. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.7(a) (1987). Case law has added the further gloss that there must
be a "substantial" change of circumstances "affecting the welfare of the child." See Tyndall v.
Tyndall, 80 N.C. App. 722, 723, 343 S.E.2d 284, 284, disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 420, 349 S.E.2d 606
(1986); Hershey v. Hershey, 57 N.C. App. 692, 694, 292 S.E.2d 141, 143 (1982); Wachacha v.
Wachacha, 38 N.C. App. 504, 507, 248 S.E.2d 375, 377 (1978).
202. See eg., Cavenaugh v. Cavenaugh, 317 N.C. 652, 660, 347 S.E.2d 19, 24 (1986) (relevant
changed circumstances include only those changes which occurred subsequent to incorporation of
agreement); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 93 N.C. App. 639, 642-43, 379 S.E.2d 93, 94 (1989) (competent
evidence for modification of custody decree includes only evidence of circumstances "existing at the
time of the prior custody decree" which were not disclosed to the court and "other pertinent circum-
stances occurring since the entry of the prior.., decree"). It should be noted, however, that in a
case involving the modification of alimony, the court of appeals held that proof of changed circum-
stances need not be limited to the previous findings of fact made in the original decree, but that the
modifying court could make additional findings as to circumstances existing at the time of the origi-
nal decree. Self v. Self, 93 N.C. App. 323, 327, 377 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1989).
203. This is an issue that has arisen in a number of states, most of which have concluded that the
changed circumstances standard should apply. For further discussion of this point, and for an argu-
ment in favor of this position, see Sharp, supra note 3.
204. See, ag., Newsome v. Newsome, 42 N.C. App. 416, 256 S.E.2d 849 (1979) (no need to
prove change of circumstances for custody modification because original decree had merely ap-
proved the agreement of the parties); Perry v. Perry, 33 N.C. App. 139, 234 S.E.2d 449, disc. rev.
[Vol. 69
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
circumstances standard should be applicable regardless of whether the initial
decree was the product of litigation or agreement. 20 5 The latter position is the
rule followed in the majority of states and is supported by a strong policy argu-
ment: withholding the protection of the changed circumstances standard from
agreement-based decrees discourages parental agreements concerning the par-
ents' children, and thereby exposes children to the always more traumatic effects
of litigation between their parents.2°6 The former position, in effect, penalizes
parents who seek to act in the best interest of their children by reaching agree-
ment in the first instance.
Although the question of according different res judicata effects to agree-
ment-based, as opposed to litigated, decree provisions regarding children had
never been fully resolved in North Carolina case law, its focus has shifted dra-
matically, and definitively, since the decision in Walters. The "contract only"
option obviously does not involve a court order of any kind. Courts have thus
reasoned, quite logically, that the child support provisions of a "contract only"
agreement may be modified merely by a showing of what is currently in the best
interests of the child, without regard to whether any change of circumstances
affecting the child has occurred since execution of the agreement. 20 7
The leading case on this issue apparently is Boyd v. Boyd, 208 in which the
court of appeals, with respect to modification of child support amounts in an
unincorporated agreement, observed that the
court is called upon, for the first time, to exercise its authority to see
that the reasonable needs of the child are provided for .... We hold
... that the moving party's only burden is to show the amount of
support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child at the time
of the hearing.2°
9
denied, 292 N.C. 730, 235 S.E.2d 784 (1977) (same); Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48, 134 S.E.2d
227 (1964) (arguably standing for this position). The rationale for this line of cases, in North Caro-
lina and elsewhere, is that only a judicial (L e., litigated) determination of issues involving children
entails the kind of "full-scale" inquiry necessary to trigger the application of res judicata principles.
Freye v. Freye, 56 Wis. 2d 193, 197, 201 N.W.2d 504, 506 (1972). Interestingly enough, some states
impose a higher burden of proof for modification of agreement-based alimony or child support de-
crees. See Sharp, supra note 3, at 1269 n.27.
205. See Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 639-40, 133 S.E.2d 487,491 (1963); Hassell v. Means, 42
N.C. App. 524, 530-31, 257 S.E.2d 123, 127 (1979); Rabon v. Ledbetter, 9 N.C. App. 376, 379, 176
S.E.2d 372, 375 (1970). Fuchs actually held that there is a "presumption" that the amount of child
support set by agreement is "just and reasonable." Fuchs, 260 N.C. at 639, 133 S.E.2d at 491. Later
cases have indicated that this "presumption" virtually disappears in the face of any "evidence to the
contrary." Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48, 59, 134 S.E.2d 227, 235 (1964).
206. See Sharp, supra note 3, at 1289-90.
207. See, e.g., Morris v. Morris, 92 N.C. App. 359, 363, 374 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1988) (when called
upon to modify child support set by agreement only, "the trial court is writing upon a clean slate,
and the previously agreed upon level of support is but one factor to be considered"); Holderness v.
Holderness, 91 N.C. App. 118, 120, 370 S.E.2d 602, 604 (1988) (with unincorporated agreement, the
"'moving party's only burden is to show the amount of support necessary to meet the reasonable
needs of the child[ren] at the time of the hearing.'" (quoting Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 76, 343
S.E.2d 581, 585 (1986))); Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 233, 346 S.E.2d 317, 319
(1986) (with an unincorporated separation agreement, the court "makes its own independent deter-
mination of what is fair and reasonable child support.").
208. 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).
209. Id. at 76, 343 S.E.2d at 584-85.
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The court's holding is a logical, and probably necessary, interpretation of North
Carolina General Statutes section 50-13.7, which requires use of the changed
circumstances standard only with court orders.2 10 Nonapplication of the stan-
dard to child support modification efforts nonetheless undermines the stability of
parental agreements, particularly those withheld from the court altogether.2 11
The risks of easy modification appear to be particularly acute for parents who
had agreed to pay sums markedly more or less than those that a court would
otherwise impose under the mandatory child support guidelines. 2 12
An additional complication stemming from this superimposition of judicial
decree upon private agreement also appears to have become rather firmly estab-
lished in North Carolina law. It seems clear that contract support rights will
survive any subsequent judicial modification. In Bottomley v. Bottomley,21 3 for
example, the court of appeals upheld a district court order that had decreased
the child support payments from the amount set forth in the parties' agreement,
but carefully noted that the judicial determination of the appropriate amount of
child support "does not change the plaintiff's contractual obligations under the
separation agreement.
'2 14
This survival of contract rights is consistent with the principles that the
court is without the authority to modify the agreement of the parties and that
the parties are likewise without authority to restrict the power of a court to act
in the best interests of the child. 2 15 This theoretical preservation of the integrity
of the parties' agreement is largely illusory, however, because, much like modifi-
able specific performance orders for the enforcement of "contract only" alimony
rights, surviving contract rights to child support are likely to be of little practical
value to the obligee.
2 16
Of immensely greater concern is the very real possibility that custody agree-
210. See supra note 201.
211. Again, it should be noted that this same risk may exist with all agreement.based decrees.
See supra notes 199-200. More recent cases have done little to clarify the confusion in this area. See,
e.g., Outlaw v. Outlaw, 89 N.C. App. 538, 540, 366 S.E.2d 247, 248 (1988) ("material change" in
circumstances must be shown to modify 1986 consent judgment); Rice v. Rice, 81 N.C. App. 247,
250, 344 S.E.2d 41, 43 (no need to show changed circumstances from time separation agreement was
entered into in 1981 in order to increase child support in 1983 final divorce decree), disc. rev. denied,
317 N.C. 706, 347 S.E.2d 439 (1986); see also Payne v. Payne, 91 N.C. App. 71, 76, 370 S.E.2d 428,
431 (1988) (reversing child support modification of consent order for failure to find necessary facts,
and relying heavily upon Coble v. Coble, 44 N.C. App. 327, 261 S.E.2d 34 (1979)). The court in
Coble noted that a contractual provision between the parents regarding child support "would only be
presumptively just and reasonable, subject to change by the court upon a showing of need." Coble,
44 N.C. App. at 331, 261 S.E.2d at 36. There appears to be no doubt whatsoever, however, that
agreements withheld from the court will not receive the benefit of the changed circumstances stan-
dard with regard to modification of child support.
212. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(cl) (Supp. 1989) authorized the Conference of Chief District
Judges to prescribe uniform statewide presumptive guidelines for the determination of child support
guidelines.
213. 82 N.C. App. 231, 346 S.E.2d 317 (1986).
214. Id. at 233, 346 S.E.2d at 319 (1986) (with an unincorporated separation agreement, the
court "makes its own independent determination of what is fair and reasonable child support").
215. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
216. Although a decree of specific performance might theoretically be available in these circum-
stances, inability to pay the contractual amount would constitute a defense to any contempt motion.
See Cavenaugh v. Cavenaugh, 317 N.C. 652, 660, 347 S.E.2d 19, 25 (1986).
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ments not presented to the court for approval or incorporation also will be de-
nied the protection of the changed circumstances standard. This is undoubtedly
the result in some cases involving interstate enforcement of such custody agree-
ments, in which several courts have clearly held that the moving party's only
burden is to show what is currently in the child's best interests.2 17 And
although the status of custody arrangements in "contract only" settlement
agreements remains unclear in North Carolina,2 18 the logical parallel with our
courts' treatment of child support is sadly compelling. This outcome would not
only discourage parental agreement as to custody, but it also would create a
virtual invitation for parents to seek modification of such unincorporated cus-
tody agreements. This result can only compound the already severe psychologi-
cal effects that divorce inflicts upon children.219 It also goes without saying that
judicial economy purposes would be (and clearly are in the case of child support)
ill served by such a rule.
Thus, in contrast to the assumption of Walters that a simple contract is an
adequate vehicle for the resolution of divorce consequences, the "contract only"
option creates risks of easy modification that are simply unacceptable when chil-
dren are involved. As a result, lawyers in the state have found themselves in a
"Catch-22" dilemma. They may incorporate or seek approval for their agree-
ments, thereby establishing contempt as a remedy and probably securing appli-
cation of the changed circumstances standard for provisions concerning
children. Unfortunately, this same approval or incorporation creates the poten-
tial for the destruction of the finality of any periodic or installment payment
portions of a property division. On the other hand, attorneys may withhold
agreements from the court, in order to ensure that the unexecuted property divi-
sions will remain noumodiflable, but only at the cost of sacrificing the applica-
tion of the changed circumstances standard to provisions concerning children
220
and the ready availability of contempt as a means of enforcement. Thus neither
of the options created by Walters furnishes an adequate, or indeed even viable,
alternative for the treatment of settlement agreements.
Faced with this unnecessarily harsh dilemma, the more kmowledgeable do-
mestic law practitioners have devised an ingenious, if highly unusual, "solution"
of sorts. Walters itself pointed the way to what aptly could be called the "cut
and paste" method for coping with the new system it announced:
For example, the parties may keep the property settlement provision
aspects of their separation agreement out of court and in contract,
217. See Sharp, supra note 3, at 1276 n.53.
218. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
219. See Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 785-
90 (1985). The author presents an excellent summary of the psychological and sociological effects of
divorce upon children. Empirical data would clearly appear to confirm the proposition that divorce
is in fact a process that extends over a period of time. Custody relitigation during this period, not
surprisingly, intensifies the adverse effects of the divorce process upon children. Id. at 790-91; see
also Sharp, supra note 3, at 1289-90 (arguing for application of the changed circumstances standard
to any agreement-based decree).
220. This is clearly the case with child support, if not so clearly with custody. See supra notes
199-219 and accompanying text.
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while presenting their provision for alimony to the court for approval.
The result of such action would be that the alimony provision is en-
forceable and modifiable as a court order while the property settlement
provisions would be enforceable and modifiable under traditional con-
tract methods.
22 1
Upon closer examination, this "cut and paste" device proves to be a rather
poor solution indeed.222 First, it clearly creates potentially severe traps, in the
form of unforeseen or unintended consequences, for all but the most knowledge-
able of domestic law practitioners and their clients.223 Second, even assuming
that one has sufficient knowledge of this complex body of law to avoid the more
obvious pitfalls, the necessity to bifurcate what is in fact a single agreement is
cumbersome, complicated, and unrealistic. By way of only one example, the
distinction between "support" and "property" rights is often difficult, if not im-
possible, to draw.224 Third, as discussed in a previous portion of this Article, 225
portions of property divisions that are embodied in a mere contract that never
receives judicial approval may create significant full faith and credit problems in
the increasingly likely event that interstate enforcement of such an agreement is
required. The necessity to undertake this kind of bifurcation, moreover, greatly
reinforces the artificial and unrealistic distinction between "separation agree-
ments" and "property settlements"-a problem that has already led to the crea-
tion of remarkable confusion in the law dealing with the effect of reconciliation
of the parties.
226
Finally, and perhaps most critically, this process of carefully choosing por-
tions of an agreement that will be submitted to the court, and just as carefully
shielding other portions of the same agreement from the court, deprives the judi-
ciary of any opportunity for meaningful judicial review. That is to say, it allows
the parties to deprive the state of any mechanism by which the interests of the
state may be protected, or even voiced.2 27 Sadly, this is a situation that is unique
221. Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 387, 298 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1983).
222. Both anecdotal experiences relayed by a large number of attorneys and a scattering of cases
that have reached the appellate level indicate that fear of modification of property divisions leads a
majority of practitioners to withhold agreements from the court.
223. In Brown v. Brown, 91 N.C. App. 335, 371 S.E.2d 752 (1988), the court set forth the
following (knowledgeable but still cumbersome) description of what had occurred with regard to the
parties' agreement:
On 21 April 1986, the parties entered into a consent order and a separation agreement.
The consent order approved a waiver of alimony ... awarded child custody and child
support ... and established visitation privileges .... The separation agreement detailed the
property settlement, included a non-molestation clause, and outlined remedies for breach
of the agreement. The separation agreement was not incorporated into the consent order.
Id. at 336, 371 S.E.2d at 753.
224. The right of a spouse to support, for instance, has long been held to be a "property" right in
North Carolina. See, e-g., Kiger v. Kiger, 258 N.C. 126, 128, 128 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1962) (right to
support and maintenance is a property right and thus may be released by contract); Bolin v. Bolin,
246 N.C. 666, 668, 99 S.E.2d 920, 922 (1957) (right of support is a property right in this state);
Daughtry v. Daughtry, 225 N.C. 358, 360, 34 S.E.2d 435, 436-37 (1945) (same); Pope v. Pope, 38
N.C. App. 328, 330, 248 S.E.2d 260, 261 (1978) ("The right of a married woman to support and
maintenance is held in this State to be a property right.").
225. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
226. See discussion infra beginning at note 233 and accompanying text.
227. Allowing opportunity for meaningful judicial review is, of course, a different matter from
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to North Carolina. 228 In the name of freedom to contract, the courts of this
state have virtually abandoned their traditional, and still critically important,
role as overseer of, if no longer "parties" to, the divorce process. 229
Ironically, true resolution of all these problems is remarkably simple. The
only disadvantage to court approval is the threat created by Walters that prop-
erty divisions, or periodic payments that are reciprocal consideration for such
divisions, might be modifiable. A definitive statement from the supreme court
that Walters does not carry such a threat to the finality of property divisions,230
or a legislative provision to ensure the finality of such divisions,231 would virtu-
ally eliminate any useful function now served by the "contract only" option. It
would thereby eliminate as well the res judicata and full faith and credit
problems caused by such extra-judicial agreements. Ironically, this suggested
resolution would accomplish what Walters set out to do in the first instance: it
would greatly simplify what had been, and is now even more, a confusing area of
the law. True alimony, as carefully defined in Marks v. Marks, would remain
modifiable.232 Other portions of an incorporated agreement would, as court or-
ders, have both res judicata and full faith and credit effect, and would be en-
forceable by contempt. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that such a
resolution would better serve the purposes of judicial economy, the lawyering
process, and the interests of the state and its citizens.
IV. THE RECONCILIATION PROBLEM
The artificial distinction between "property" and "separation" agreements
obviously constitutes a major analytical weakness of the Walters opinion. It also
constitutes, however, the primary vehicle by which Walters can be reconciled
with existing law on the relationship between property divisions and divorce
decrees.2 33 Unfortunately, in the context of the law regarding the effects of rec-
onciliation upon settlement agreements, a similar distinction has been drawn,
undertaking such a review-a subject that will be dealt with in a forthcoming article. That the
mechanism exists which allows the opportunity, however, is critical.
228. See supra note 15.
229. With the advent of no-fault divorce, the state may no longer be an active "third party" to
divorce. See supra note 43. That does not mean, however, that it has become a disinterested ob-
server in the process.
230. Such "finality" would, of course, be cushioned by the availability of motions to set aside,
vacate or amend, as discussed smpra at notes 106-09.
231. Several states have statutory provisions that allow parties to contract for nonmodifiable
alimony. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, para. 502(f) (1984) (except for terms concerning the
support, custody, or visitation of children, the judgment may expressly preclude or limit modifica-
tion of terms if the separation agreement so provides); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.180(6) (Michie
1984) (same); MD. FAMILY LAW CODE ANN. § 8-103c (1984) ("court may modify any provision of
... agreement... with respect to alimony or spousal support... unless there is... a provision that
specifically states that the provisions with respect to alimony or spousal support are not subject to
any court modification."); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (1990) (court may modify spousal support
unless a stipulation or contract signed by party receiving relief and filed prior to entry of final decree
stipulates otherwise); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.070(7) (Supp. 1990) (when separation con-
tract so provides, decree may expressly preclude or limit modification of any provision for
maintenance).
232. See supra notes 168-72.
233. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
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with results that are the ironic mirror image of the threat Walters poses to the
finality of property divisions.
Analytically and developmentally, the law on the effects of reconciliation
on settlement agreements has paralleled the changes, and ensuing confusion,
that have occurred in the law affecting settlement agreements and final decrees.
For decades, the law was quite straightforward. Like the majority of states,
North Carolina held that separation agreements could be entered into only after
separation of the parties, 234 and that reconciliation between the parties voided
the executory, but not the executed, portions of the agreement.235 Unlike all
other states, North Carolina followed for years the anachronistic principle that
either a resumption of cohabitation between the parties,2 36 or, under the rule of
Murphy v. Murphy, a single act of sexual intercourse between the parties, could
constitute a reconciliation.237 Repeated and unsuccessful attempts by the court
of appeals238 to chip away at the inflexible Murphy rule were finally rendered
moot by the enactment of North Carolina General Statutes section 52-10.2,
which sensibly defines the resumption of marital relations as "voluntary renewal
of the husband and wife relationship, as shown by the totality of the circum-
stances.' 239 To allay any doubts surrounding the interpretation of this statute,
the drafters explicitly provided that "[ilsolated incidents of sexual intercourse
between the parties shall not constitute resumption of marital relations."
'24°
Legislative abrogation of the harsh Murphy rule should have marked the
end of difficulty surrounding the effect of reconciliation in this state. Unfortu-
nately, a new area of confusion arose instead, focusing squarely upon the at-
tempt to distinguish and sever (and treat differently) the "separation agreement"
and "property division" portions of a settlement agreement.
This focus upon the highly technical distinction between "separation agree-
ments" and "property settlement agreements" hardly sprang from thin air. In-
deed, the difficulties in, and importance of, controlling whether or not provisions
for payment of periodic sums of money were "true alimony" or reciprocal con-
sideration for property division,241 had led lawyers commonly to use separate
headings in one agreement. Thus an instrument titled "separation agreement
and property settlement" would be divided into two distinct portions, one la-
beled "property division," and the other labeled "separation agreement.1
242
Placement of a provision for periodic payments of sums to a spouse in the "prop-
234. See H. CLARx, supra note 1, at 757. The traditional rationale for this requirement was that
unless agreements were executed just prior to, or after separation of the parties, they would tend to
"promote" divorce and therefore would violate public policy. 2 R. LEE, supra note 10, § 188, at 466.
235. See 2 R. LEE, supra note 10, § 188, at 515.
236. In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 391, 230 S.E.2d 541, 545 (1976) ("a separation
agreement between husband and wife is terminated for every purpose insofar as it remains executory
upon their resumption of the marital relation").
237. Murphy v. Murphy, 295 N.C. 390, 397, 245 S.E.2d 693, 698 (1978) ("sexual intercourse
between a husband and a wife after the execution of a separation agreement avoids the contract").
238. See Sharp, supra note 2, at 842-43.
239. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.2 (Supp. 1989).
240. Id.
241. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
242. See Stanley v. Cox, 253 N.C. 620, 629, 117 S.E.2d 826, 832 (1961). Professor Lee made this
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erty division" portion of the agreement was a compelling indicia of an integrated
agreement and helped ensure that the provision would be nonmodifable.243 It
was in fact this practice that formed much of the basis for the distinction drawn
in Walters, which, in turn, powerfully reinforced the artificial division of a single
instrument into two parts.
Equally significant in this development was the enactment of the Equitable
Distribution of Property Act, particularly subsection (d), which authorizes par-
ties "[b]efore, during or after marriage" to "provide for distribution of the mari-
tal property in a manner deemed by the parties to be equitable."' 2 " This
provision, innocuous on its face, did work a profound change in North Carolina
law, particularly in the law of antenuptial agreements. 245 More relevant for our
purposes is the fact that this provision received a precipitous, and almost cer-
tainly incorrect, interpretation in the case of Buffington v. Buffington.246
In Buffington the parties signed a separation agreement, but continued to
live together for eighteen days thereafter. The wife later sought an equitable
distribution of property on the grounds that the continued cohabitation after the
execution of the agreement had rendered it void.2 47 The court of appeals upheld
the validity of the agreement, but not on the traditional grounds that the contin-
ued cohabitation was of insufficient duration to violate public policy. Instead, it
reasoned that "by the enactment of section 50-20(d), the General Assembly
manifested a clear intent to change the former rule which required the actual
separation of the parties to a marriage in order for a property settlement to be
effective between spouses."'248 It continued to observe, quite correctly, that the
new section "permits spouses to execute a property settlement at any time, re-
gardless of whether they separate immediately thereafter or not." 249 It then
concluded, however, in a classic example of the kind of confusion in terminology
that pervades this area of law, that the wife "cannot avoid her separation agree-
precise suggestion as to terminology and practice. 2 R. LEE, supra note 10, § 188, at 462. More
specifically, he stated that:
Hence, if the draftsman is called upon to incorporate into a single contract the provisions
of both a true separation agreement and a true property settlement, as will usually be the
wishes of the parties when they reach the point of separation, it would be prudent for him
to state the provisions of the separation and the provisions of property settlement so that
everyone will readily understand that they are distinguishable. A simple way of accom-
plishing this purpose is to head the instrument, "Separation Agreement and Property Set-
tlement," and then proceed to divide the instrument into two parts ....
Id. Throughout his treatise, however, Professor Lee uses the term "separation agreement" in the
broad sense to include a full settlement of all marital rights and issues.
243. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
244. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(d) (1987).
245. For a discussion of the limited scope of antenuptial contracts in North Carolina prior to
1981, see 2 R. LEE, supra note 10, § 188, at 434-44. The passage of the Uniform Premarital Agree-
ment Act in 1987 has vastly expanded the scope of antenuptial contractual freedom beyond that
authorized in the Equitable Distribution of Property Act. See 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 473 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52B (1987)).
246. 69 N.C. App. 483, 317 S.E.2d 97 (1984). In all fairness, it should be noted that Buffington
was one of the first appellate decisions interpreting the new Act.
247. Id. at 484, 317 S.E.2d at 98.
248. Id. at 488, 317 S.E.2d at 100 (emphasis added).
249. Id.
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ment solely on the grounds that she continued to live with plaintiff for 18 days
after the agreement was signed."'250
The problem with Buffington is both obvious and simple: it failed to distin-
guish between a pure division of property that, as clearly set forth in the statute,
can occur at any time without regard to the separation of the parties, and an
agreement that settles all the rights of the parties arising out of the marriage -
i.e., a separation or settlement agreement.251 The latter type of agreement
clearly does require separation of the parties, either at the time of or shortly
after, its execution.2 5 2 Indeed, the separation of the parties is itself part of the
necessary consideration upon which the agreement must be based.25 3 At the
risk of belaboring the point, a "separation" agreement may, and usually does,
include provisions for property division; a property division, however, "says
nothing about support or alimony for the wife, custody or support of children,
or the right to live separate and apart."
254
The failure of the court in Buffington to recognize that a clear statutory
authorization2 55 for parties to execute agreements disposing of marital property
rights during marriage is not, and should not be interpreted to be, the equivalent
of authority for parties to execute true separation or settlement agreements dur-
ing marriage is thus a serious error. On its facts, the opinion is at least limited to
the situation in which parties continue to cohabit after execution of a separation
agreement. 25 6 The court's broad interpretation of North Carolina General Stat-
utes section 50-20(d) as evincing a legislative intent to change the traditional
rules regarding "separation agreements" and its consistent confusion in the use
of the terms "separation agreement" and "property agreement," however, have
obvious and serious implications for the rules involving the effect of reconcilia-
tion of the parties.
25 7
The court of appeals appears to have recognized that an expansive interpre-
tation of Buffington might bind parties to settlement agreements despite any sub-
sequent reconciliation. In quick succession, the court handed down two
opinions in 1985 that appeared effectively to limit and distinguish Buffington and
250. Id. (emphasis added).
251. In fact, even prior to passage of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1987), parties could contract
with reference to property during marriage. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10(a) (1984); 2 R. LEE,
supra note 10, § 188, at 460.
252. 2 R. LEE, supra note 10, § 188, at 460.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. It should be noted, however, that even prior to passage of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(d),
husbands and wives were authorized to enter into such agreements under the provisions of N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 52-10 to -10.1. See also 2 R. LEE, supra note 10, at 460 ("A property settlement, as
such, may be validly entered into when the parties are ... living together with no intention of
separating.").
256. See, e.g., Carlton v. Carlton, 74 N.C. App. 690, 694, 329 S.E.2d 682 (1985), discussed in fra
at notes 263-67 and accompanying text. It is even possible, and certainly desirable, that Buffington
might be interpreted to apply only to property division agreements executed while parties are still
living together. See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
257. For a very good discussion of the weaknesses of the analysis in Bufflngton, see Note, Prop-
erty Settlement or Separation Agreement: Perpetuating the Confusion, 63 N.C.L. REv. 1166 (1985).
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to reaffirm the traditional rules, particularly with regard to the effects of
reconciliation.
In Case v. Case,258 the defendant husband had executed a quitclaim deed to
the marital residence pursuant to a separation agreement. The parties then rec-
onciled for one week, and the husband subsequently claimed that this reconcilia-
tion had voided the parties' agreement. 259 The court of appeals held simply that
the provision concerning the marital home was executed, not executory, and
thus was unaffected by the reconciliation. 26° Significantly, it cited Buffington
only for the proposition that a "request for equitable distribution of property
may not be granted in the face of a prior, valid agreement disposing of the par-
ties' marital property," 261 and went on to observe that North Carolina General
Statutes section 50-20(d) "did not purport to change the validity of separation
agreements.
'262
Carlton v. Carlton 263 posed an even more direct confrontation with the pos-
sible implications raised by Buffington. The parties in Carlton had separated
and signed a "Deed of Separation" in 1963, in which the wife had waived any
right to property "'now owned or hereafter acquired'" by the husband.
2 64
Shortly after the agreement was signed, the parties reconciled and continued to
live together until 1982, at which time they again separated. The husband's at-
tempt to rely upon Buffington to bar the wife's equitable distribution claim was
swiftly dismissed by the court of appeals, which found Buffington distinguish-
able265 and reaffirmed the traditional rule that the wife's promise was executory
and thus was voided by the reconciliation.2 66 Significantly, the court went on to
hold that:
We do not believe that in enacting G.S. 50-20(d) the General Assembly
intended that a written separation agreement, once entered into, would
be forever binding, forever a bar to an equitable distribution action.
Rather, the parties to separation agreements must still be able to can-
cel their agreements, and the indicia of the intent to cancel as devel-
oped in our common law, we believe, must also still be intact.267
Although neither Case nor Carlton posed a direct challenge to the Buffing-
ton proposition that a separation agreement is unaffected by the continued co-
258. 73 N.C. App. 76, 325 S.E.2d 661, rev. denied, 313 N.C. 597, 330 S.E.2d 606 (1985).
259. Id. at 77, 79, 325 S.E.2d at 662-63.
260. Id. at 79-80, 325 S.E.2d at 664.
261. Id. at 82, 325 S.E.2d at 665.
262. Id. at 81, 325 S.E.2d at 665; see also McArthur v. McArthur, 68 N.C. App. 484, 487, 315
S.E.2d 344, 346 (1984) (holding that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(d) "did not purport to change the
general validity of separation agreements").
263. 74 N.C. App. 690, 329 S.E.2d 682 (1985).
264. Id. at 693, 329 S.E.2d at 684 (quoting the parties' separation agreement).
265. Id. at 694, 329 S.E.2d at 685. 'The court in Carlton observed that Bu ington "is distinguish-
able, because it dehls with common law principles affecting the validity of separation agreements
entered into while the parties are still living together." Id. Again, such a statement confuses separa-
tion agreements with agreements to divide marital property.
266. Id. at 693, 329 S.E.2d at 684.
267. Id. at 694, 329 S.E.2d at 685.
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habitation of the parties, 268 they clearly appeared to eliminate the possibility
that courts would interpret subsection (d) of the equitable distribution act to
have destroyed the settled principles involving the effect of reconciliation upon
settlement agreements. Unfortunately, several recent cases from the court of
appeals may well have compounded the confusion between separation and prop-
erty settlement agreements, eliminated the distinction between executed and ex-
ecutory provisions of a settlement agreement insofar as the effect of
reconciliation is concerned, and, in short, reduced this area of the law to a state
of almost total confusion.
The first of these opinions is particularly complicated. In 1980 the parties in
Small v. Small 269 had executed a "Post-Nuptial Contract" which contained
waivers of alimony and existing or after-acquired rights in the property of one
another. They subsequently entered into two separation agreements, each af-
firming the terms of the postnuptial agreement. Both parties conceded, how-
ever, that they had had sexual relations several times after each agreement was
executed. 270 At trial, the husband was granted a summary judgment denying
the wife's claim for property division and alimony. The wife appealed only the
denial of her claim to equitable distribution, contending that continuation of the
parties' sexual relationship had voided the separation agreements and that the
1980 agreement was void as contrary to public policy.
27 1
The court of appeals, in an opinion that purported to rest upon the techni-
cal distinction between a "separation" agreement and a "property settlement"
agreement, affirmed the lower court. 272 It reached this result, however, by way
of an analysis that is not only remarkably confusing, but is also profoundly
flawed analytically in at least two different respects. First, the court apparently
ignored the fact that each of the three agreements was a single instrument deal-
ing with both support and property rights. Instead, it severed out the "property
division" portions of all the agreements from the support provisions thereof,
273
and then concluded that the property division agreements "must be analyzed
with reference to those rules which pertain to property settlements rather than
268. Other cases arguably have posed this challenge, however. See infra notes 307-08 and ac-
companying text.
269. 93 N.C. App. 614, 379 S.E.2d 273 (1989).
270. Id. at 619-20, 379 S.E.2d at 276.
271. Id. at 620, 379 S.E.2d at 276. It appears, however, that the analysis of the court would have
been precisely the same even had wife perfected an appeal from the dismissal of her alimony claim.
Wife's arguments with regard to the property division issues appear, moreover, to have been correct.
Because the "postnuptial" agreement dealt with support and property rights, it constituted a true
"separation agreement," and thus violated the public policy rule against execution of such agree-
ments while parties are still living together. Id. at 619-20, 379 S.E.2d at 276. Because the parties
had engaged in sexual intercourse after the execution of each of the separation agreements, more-
over, the executory provisions of such agreements would have been void. See supra note 239 and
accompanying text. Small, however, clearly changed the rules during the ball game with regard to
wife's arguments.
272. Small, 93 N.C. App. at 624-27, 379 S.E.2d at 279-81.
273. Id. at 621, 379 S.E.2d at 277-78. The court used conclusory logic to support its opinion on
this issue, noting that "the alimony provisions of the Post-Nuptial Contract are clearly separable
from the property division." Id.
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separation agreements." 274 This division of what is in fact one instrument into
two distinct agreements, to which different rules were then applied, is in itself a
radical departure from well-established principles. 275 It also directly conflicts
with the firmly established principle that a "separation agreement" deals with
both property and support rights.
27 6
The court went on, moreover, to compound greatly its initial error by elimi-
nating the distinction between executed and executory provisions of a "property
settlement" agreement insofar as the effect of reconciliation is concerned. Rec-
onciliation of the parties, it held, would have no effect on a property division
"whether or not the provisions of the property settlement have been fully exe-
cuted."' 277 Although the court purported to rely upon the leading case of Jones
v. Lewis 278 for its conclusion, the Jones case has long stood, and clearly contin-
ues to stand, for precisely the opposite proposition: that reconciliation voids all
executory provisions of a settlement agreement, without regard to whether those
provisions concern support or property.279
The opinion in Small undoubtedly sent shock waves throughout the domes-
tic bar in the state. It was, however, sufficiently confusing280 and sufficiently at
odds with the entire body of appellate law in this area that it might have been
regarded, much like Buffington, as an aberrant opinion, to be distinguished,
rather than followed, by future cases. Unfortunately, within two months the
court of appeals came again to the same conclusion, and this time with consider-
able clarity, in In re Estate of TuccL
28 1
274. Id. at 622, 379 S.E.2d at 278.
275. At the risk of stating the obvious, the well-recognized distinction between a "separation"
agreement and a "property settlement" agreement does not mean that the property division portion
of a separation agreement is severable from the remainder of the agreement. A "property division"
agreement deals only with property; a "separation" agreement deals with property and support
rights. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 45; 2 R. LEE, supra note 10, § 188, at 461. Although it is possible, of course,
to encounter a separation agreement that does not deal with property rights, such agreements almost
always dispose of all marital rights, including both support and property rights. Id.; H. CLARK,
supra note 1, at 756.
277. Small, 93 N.C. App. at 625, 379 S.E.2d at 279 (emphasis added). The court reasoned that,
since the parties could have executed a property division without regard to resumption of sexual
intercourse, living separate and apart constituted no part of the consideration for the agreement. Id.
at 624, 379 S.E.2d at 279. Such logic is impeccable when applied to a simple agreement dividing
marital property; it is wholly inapplicable and inapposite, however, when a "separation agreement"
and "property division" ace embodied in one instrument.
278. 243 N.C. 259, 90 S.E.2d 547 (1955). See infira notes 297-300 and accompanying text for an
explanation of why the court's reliance upon this case in Small is clearly misplaced.
279. Jones, 243 N.C. at 261, 90 S.E.2d at 549; see also In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386,
391, 230 S.E.2d 541, 545 (1976) (A "separation agreement between husband and wife is terminated
for every purpose insofar as it remains executory upon their resumption of the marital relation.").
Both cases clearly use the term "separation agreement" in its common form, Le., to include agree-
ments as to property and support rights.
280. Using the term "separation agreement" in its most restrictive sense, to encompass only
agreements for support and custody, Small did reiterate the traditional rule that such an agreement
"'is terminated for every purpose insofar as it remains executory upon their resumption of the mari-
tal relation.'" Small, 93 N.C. App. at 626, 379 S.E.2d at 280 (quoting Adamee, 291 N.C. at 391,
230 S.E.2d at 545). No case prior to Small, however, ever gave the term "separation agreement"
such a restrictive definition.
281. 94 N.C. App. 428, 380 S.E.2d 782, disc rev. denied, 325 N.C. 271, 384 S.E.2d 514 (1989).
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The parties in Tucci executed a "Separation Agreement" in November of
1983,282 reconciled in December of that year, and lived together until September,
1985, when they again separated. 28 3 Mrs. Tucci died in March of 1986, and Mr.
Tucci dissented from the will. The district and superior courts found that the
reconciliation had voided the 1983 separation agreement, and that the husband's
waiver of his right to dissent under the agreement was executory at the time of
the reconciliation, and thus was voided by the reconciliation, leaving husband
free to dissent.28 4 Relying heavily upon its opinion in Small, the court of ap-
peals reversed. It did so, however, with a logic that confirmed and compounded
the analytical flaws of the earlier case, and deserves close attention.
The court first concluded, far too easily, that the statutory right to dissent,
because it did not affect any marital support duty and was not conditioned upon
living separate and apart, was a property right.28 5 This property right would, it
reasoned, be part of a "property settlement," and under Small property settle-
ments are severable from "separation agreement" portions of the instrument.
2 86
Thus, the court concluded, it was "immaterial" 2 87 whether the release was exec-
utory or executed at the time of the reconciliation, because, unlike a "separation
agreement, .... no public policy is offended by the continued validity of the prop-
erty settlement provisions of this Agreement. '288 Finally, the court came to the
hasty, and almost certainly incorrect, conclusion that Carlton v. Carlton 2
89
which clearly would have required affirming the decisions of the lower courts
apparently had been "superseded" by a recent case from the supreme court.
290
Close examination of the premises upon which the analysis. in both Small
and Tucci are based reveals that both decisions are fundamentally flawed. First,
the implicit assumption in both cases that the "support" elements in an agree-
ment even can be identified with any certainty is contradicted by the well-
282. Id. at 429, 380 S.E.2d at 783. The instrument was titled "Separation Agreement," and was
referred to in the instrument as a "Separation Agreement and Property Settlement." Id. The divi-
sion of the single instrument into two parts is, as noted previously, a common practice in North
Carolina, particularly since the Walters opinion. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. The
majority opinion in Tucci went to considerable pains to deduce that the "Separation Agreement"
was in fact two separate, and severable, agreements. Tucci, 94 N.C. App. at 434-37, 380 S.E.2d at
785-87. The dissent pointed out that the agreement itself, and the findings of fact unexcepted to
below, clearly indicated that the instrument was a single entity, a separation agreement. Id. at 440,
380 S.E.2d at 789 (Eagles, J., dissenting). Anyone unfamiliar with the tangled history of this nomen-
clature in North Carolina would be utterly confounded by the court's discussion of this issue.
283. Tucci, 94 N.C. App. at 430, 380 S.E.2d at 783. The parties had entered into a consent
judgment for a divorce from bed and board in December 1985, but the court of appeals had earlier
upheld an order setting aside that consent judgment on the grounds that it contained no findings as
to appropriate grounds for the divorce. Allred v. Tucci, 85 N.C. App. 138, 143, 354 S.E.2d 291, 295,
cert. denied, 320 N.C. 166, 358 S.E.2d 47 (1987).
284. Tucci, 94 N.C. App. at 431-32, 380 S.E.2d at 784.
285. Id. at 436, 380 S.E.2d at 787.
286. Id. The court also held that the resumption of the marital relationship did not constitute an
"implied rescission" of the "property division." Id. at 436-37, 380 S.E.2d at 787.
287. Id. at 437, 380 S.E.2d at 787.
288. Id. at 438, 380 S.E.2d at 787.
289. 74 N.C. App. 690, 329 S.E.2d 682 (1985); see supra notes 263-67 and accompanying text.
290. Tucci, 94 N.C. App. at 439, 380 S.E.2d at 788. For a discussion of the court's interpreta-




defined distinction between "true alimony" and payments labeled "support" or
"alimony." 291 It is further contradicted by an established, if somewhat surpris-
ing, line of cases holding that the right to support in North Carolina is a "prop-
erty right. ' 292  Second, the assumption that the "separation agreement"
portions and the "property division" portions of a single agreement can be sev-
ered from one another is contradicted by common sense, common experience,
and-most critically-by the still viable concept of reciprocal consideration.
29 3
As Professor Homer Clark, the leading commentator on domestic law in
the nation, has aptly observed: "A property settlement is just that portion of the
separation agreement dealing with property of the spouses."' 294 He continues to
explain that because property division and alimony provisions are so closely re-
lated "[it is therefore both misleading and unhelpful to talk as if there were two
different kinds of agreements and as if the impact of reconciliation upon one
should be different from the impact on the other. Specious distinctions of this
kind ought to be abandoned. ' 295 Ironically, moreover, the cases upon which
both Small and Tucci rely for the "severance" conclusion and for the proposi-
tion that even "unexecuted" provisions of a property division are unaffected by a
reconciliation are in fact an affirmation not only of the traditional rules in this
area, but of the reciprocal consideration or integrated agreement principle as
well.29 6 In particular, both Tucci and Small relied heavily upon Jones v.
Lewis 297 and Love v. Mewborn.2 9 8 In fact, Jones stands for precisely the opposite
result. In unmistakably clear language, that case held: "It is well established in
this jurisdiction that where a husband and wife enter into a separation agree-
ment and thereafter become reconciled .and renew their marital relations, the
agreement is terminated for every purpose insofar as it remains executory.
'299
The property division provisions in question in Jones, moreover, werefully exe-
cuted at the time of the parties' reconciliation.
3
00
291. See supra notes 161-73 and accompanying text. Since true alimony clearly requires a court
order, it is even possible to suggest that no provision for "alimony" in a separation agreement that
has not been incorporated into a final divorce decree meets the technical definition of alimony.
292. See, eg., Kiger v. Kiger, 258 N.C. 126, 128, 128 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1962) (right to support is
a property right in North Carolina), and cases cited supra at note 224.
293. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
294. H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 770. Professor Clark goes on to point out that, particularly
under equitable distribution schemes that call for a "just" or "equitable" distribution of property
according to certain statutory factors, "the purpose and function of the property division then looks
very much like the purpose and function of alimony .... The task of making a rational distinction
between the two becomes difficult, indeed impossible." Id. at 594. North Carolina's equitable distri-
bution statute, it will be observed, falls precisely into the category singled out by Professor Clark.
295. Id.
296. See supra notes 64-70.
297. 243 N.C. 259, 90 S.E.2d 547 (1955).
298. 79 N.C. App. 465, 339 S.E.2d 487, disc rev. denied, 317 N.C. 704, 347 S.E.2d 43 (1986).
For a further discussion of this case, see supra notes 297-98; infra note 300.
299. Jones, 243 N.C. at 261, 90 S.E.2d at 549. It should be noted that the statement from Jones
that both Small and Tucci relied upon, that "[r]egardless of what the rule may be as to a settlement
with executory provisions, an executed property settlement is not affected by a mere reconciliation
.... "was a reference from an A.L.R. annotation discussing the law of other states. Id. Jones itself
makes it clear that the North Carolina rule is that the executory portions of a settlement agreement
are voided by a reconciliation.
300. Id. at 259, 90 S.E.2d at 548.
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Although the Love case is slightly more complicated, it nevertheless consti-
tutes an equally clear affirmation of the traditional rules. The parties in Love
executed a separation agreement in 1980 under which the defendant husband
agreed to pay the wife $800.00 per month "alimony" for ten years. The parties
"reconciled" for twenty-four hours in May of 1981, and defendant ceased mak-
ing payments after that date.301 Husband contended at trial that under the rule
of Murphy v. Murphy30 2 the reconciliation terminated his "executory" duty to
make the alimony payments. The court of appeals did observe that property
settlements "are not necessarily terminated by reconciliation. ' 30 3 It went on,
however, to make it clear that these payment provisions, which were in the nar-
row sense, "executory" because they had not been paid in full, were in fact part
of a "separation agreement and property settlement" that was "intended to be
mutually dependent, '' 304 and thus were not voided by the reconciliation. This
explicit recognition of the operation and validity of the reciprocal consideration
or integrated agreement principle in this context makes it clear that Love does
not, and should not be interpreted to, stand for the proposition that even unexe-
cuted provisions of a settlement agreement are unaffected by reconciliation. The
wife in Love had fully performed-e., executed-her half of the bargain: the
husband was merely told that he must likewise perform his half of the bargain,
for which he had already received full consideration. 30 5
A thorough analysis of Love reveals that the case is the predivorce
equivalent of the integrated agreement principle and thus lends virtually no sup-
port to the conclusions reached in Small and Tucci. If one side of a bargain is
fully executed, the other must be as well. If one side of a bargain (property
division) is not modifiable, then the same result must obtain for the other half of
the bargain. In the context of an integrated agreement, part of which has been
executed, the label "executory" simply has no meaning to which any substantive
consequence should attach. To interpret Love as Small and Tucci did gives one
party the benefit of the bargain and wholly deprives the other party of the con-
sideration which formed the basis of the bargain in the first instance. 306
301. Love, 79 N.C. App. at 466, 339 S.E.2d at 488.
302. Id. For a discussion of the Murphy decision, see supra note 237 and accompanying text.
303. Love, 79 N.C. App. at 466, 339 S.E.2d at 488. In Small, the court of appeals summarized
the Love opinion as: "upholding cash payments as part of property settlement even though obliga-
tion executory when parties resumed sexual relations." Small, 93 N.C. App. at 625, 379 S.E.2d at
280. As this discussion illustrates, this description of the holding in Love is both inadequate and
inaccurate.
304. Love, 79 N.C. App. at 467, 339 S.E.2d at 489. It should also be noted that the Love opinion
specifically cited to White v. White, 296 N.C. 661, 252 S.E.2d 698 (1979), the leading case on the
principle of integrated agreements, in support of its conclusion. See supra notes 71-74 and accompa-
nying text. The evidence below, including negotiation letters between the attorneys for the parties in
Love, left no doubt that the "alimony" payments were in fact a property settlement. Love, 79 N.C.
App. at 467, 339 S.E.2d at 489.
305. See, eg., I A. CORBIN ON CoNTrcrs 631-35 (1953) (discussing nonsimultaneous perform-
ance and constructive conditions).
306. For a more concrete example of the kind of injustice that can be produced by the Small and
Tucci decisions, see Howell v. Landry, 96 N.C. App. 516, 386 S.E.2d 610 (1989). In that case the
court held that the alimony provisions in a prenuptial agreement were invalid because the agreement
was executed prior to the enactment of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52B (the Uniform Premarital Agreement
Act), at which time such provisions were void under the law. Howell, 96 N.C. App. at 525-26, 386
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Several other cases stand for this same predivorce integration proposition.
Potts v. Potts, for example, held that the "alimony" provisions of a settlement
agreement would not be abrogated by a subsequent reconciliation, where the
property settlement portion of the agreement was fully executed.30 7 Similarly,
in Whitt v. Whitt, the wife was ordered specifically to perform (to transfer prop-
erty as called for in the settlement agreement) even after reconciliation, where
the agreement was otherwise fully executed. 30 8 In each case the provision in
question was technically "executory" at the time of the reconciliation. In each
case the other party had fully performed his or her half of the bargain. The most
elementary of contract principles dictates that there can be no other result.
30 9
Finally, the Tucci court's reliance upon the case of Higgins v. Higgins,3 10 in
support of its result, and in derogation of Carlton v. Carlton,3 11 seems almost
entirely misplaced. Higgins dealt with the narrow question of how to interpret a
provision in a separation agreement requiring that the parties live "separate and
apart" for one year before the wife would be obligated to convey the marital
home to the husband.3 12 It held that, at the time the agreement was entered
into, the term "living separate and apart" must be construed to have meant that
the parties could not engage in sexual relations. They admittedly had done so
several times, and thus the court held that the provision for transfer of the house
was unenforceable. 313 In the course of its discussion the court did observe that
it believed this resolution was consistent with Love, Buffington, and North Caro-
lina General Statutes section 50-20(d).3 14 In the next sentence, however, the
plurality decision explained that the statute "provides that married persons may
provide for division of maritalproperty while they are cohabiting.... [and] Love
and Buffington hold that such agreements are enforceable under the statute.
3 15
Thus, if anything, it appears that Higgins should be interpreted as an affir-
mation of the traditional rule that property settlement agreements may be en-
tered into at any time, and that the executory portions of such agreements may
be affected by conduct of the parties after execution of the agreement and before
a final divorce decree. By no stretch of the imagination, however, does Higgins
support the "severance" position of Small and Tucci or the elimination of the
S.E.2d at 615-16. The court went on, however, to sever the "property division" portion of the agree-
ment and find that it was enforceable under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(d). Howell, 96 N.C. App. at
530-32, 386 S.E.2d at 618-20. The case thus stands, once again, for the anomalous proposition that
only half of a bargain is enforceable.
307. 24 N.C. App. 673, 674-75, 211 S.E.2d 815, 816 (1975).
308. 32 N.C. App. 125, 129-30, 230 S.E.2d 793, 796 (1977).
309. See supra notes 301-04 and accompanying text.
310. 321 N.C. 482, 364 S.E.2d 426 (1988) (plurality opinion).
311. 74 N.C. App. 690, 329 S.E.2d 682 (1985). See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
312. Higgins, 321 N.C. at 484, 364 S.E.2d at 428 (Webb, J., plurality).
313. Id. at 485, 364 S.E.2d at 428-29 (Webb, J., plurality).
314. Id. at 485, 364 S.E.2d. at 428 (Webb, J., plurality).
315. Id. at 485, 364 S.E.2d at 429 (Webb, J., plurality) (emphasis added). In his dissent, Justice
Whichard cited Buffington merely for the proposition that "spouses may now execute a property
settlement at any time, without separating afterwards." Id. at 491, 364 S.E.2d at 432 (Whichard, J.,
dissenting).
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traditional distinction between executory and executed provisions of the
agreement.
For a variety of reasons, therefore, it appears that the analytical founda-
tions of Small and Tucci are weak indeed. The integrated agreement principle
is, and should be, as compelling in the predivorce context as it is the postdivorce
context. The distinction between "separation" agreements and "property divi-
sion" agreements is equally unrealistic and artificial in either context.
V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the law regarding settlement
agreements in North Carolina has been reduced to such a state of confusion as
almost to defy summary. This Article, moreover, has taken an apparently ironic
approach toward resolution of some of the most troubling developments in this
area of the law in the past decade. It has, on the one hand, urged that Walters
be interpreted to have focused on the highly technical distinction between a sep-
aration agreement and a property settlement agreement, in order to preserve the
critically important principle of finality of property division portions of settle-
ment agreements. It has also criticized that opinion for allocating to private
parties an unparalleled, and unsound, freedom to contract, by its creation of the
"contract only" option.
On the other hand, the Article has criticized as unjust, unrealistic, and un-
precedented, the use of a similar technical distinction by the court of appeals to
determine the effects of a reconciliation upon a settlement agreement. In this
context, the distinction between a separation agreement and a property settle-
ment, and particularly the severance of the latter from the former, has under-
mined the intentions of the parties and has limited their freedom to contract.
The more significant point, however, is that regardless of whether the use of
this artificial distinction has had salutary or unfortunate effects, the distinction
itself is a largely inappropriate vehicle for the imposition of legal consequences
as important as the modifiability of property divisions or the effect of reconcilia-
tion on a settlement agreement. Rather, those consequences should be deter-
mined by rules that look to the substance, not the form, of settlement agreements
and that attempt to carry out the intentions of the parties. Such rules should,
above all, include the concept of an integrated agreement.
With regard to the problem of the effect of reconciliation upon settlement
agreements, Small and Tucci have clearly created great confusion, at both ana-
lytical and practical levels. That issue clearly needs definitive clarification from
the supreme court. A major thrust of this Article has been the proposition that
any instrument that deals with support and property rights, and that purports to
be a "final settlement" of all issues between the parties is a single instrument - a
settlement or "separation" agreement that cannot, and must not, be severed into
two contracts, one of them subject to one set of rules and the other subject to a
different set of rules. Again, the concept of an integrated agreement is critical.
Whatever the rule with regard to the effect of reconciliation, it should be the
same rule for the entire agreement.
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Ironically, the principle of the finality of property divisions (including, of
course, any periodic payments that are reciprocal consideration for a waiver of
property rights, regardless of the label attached thereto) can best be preserved, in
the face of the language of Walters, by drawing this technical distinction be-
tween a "separation" and a "property" settlement agreement. This "solution,"
it must be admitted, has little to recommend it beyond the fact of saving Walters
from its own careless use of terminology. This awkward "solution" need not be
sustained beyond a clear statement, from either the supreme court or the legisla-
ture, that leaves intact both the principle that property divisions incorporated in
a divorce decree are final judgments and the corollary and analytically almost
identical principle of reciprocal consideration or integration. Resolution of this
finality issue would also obviate the practical need for the division of a settle-
ment agreement into two distinct headings.
The continued and unmistakable viability of the principle of finality of
property divisions incorporated into decrees is critical for two reasons. First, in
the absence of assurance that property divisions so incorporated are nonmodifi-
able, parties and their lawyers will, and indeed must, continue to make use of the
"contract only" option created by Walters. Second, as this Article has sought to
demonstrate, this option is woefully inadequate to meet the needs of the parties.
It results in the denial of res judicata consequences to the agreement, thus en-
dangering enforcement of the agreement in other jurisdictions. It also virtually
invites parties to seek modification of the provisions of their agreement affecting
children. The absence of the changed circumstances standard for provisions af-
fecting children creates additional, and needless, strains upon the parties, their
children, and the judicial system itself.
More importantly, the "contract only" option virtually bars the judicial
branch from playing any effective role in the distributional consequences of di-
vorce. As this Article has pointed out, settlement agreements are different from
other kinds of contracts, both in terms of the interests of the state in such con-
tracts and in terms of the "market" in which the agreements are negotiated.
And although the issue of whether judicial review of all settlement agreements
should be required in North Carolina is beyond the scope of this Article, the
opportunity for such review must, as a matter of vitally important public policy,
be preserved.
Judicial elimination of the "contract only" option would, in fact, be a desir-
able outcome. It is probably not necessary, however, because the advantages of
judicial review of agreements-so long as the finality of property divisions can be
preserved-so far outweigh any advantages of the "contract only" option that it
is difficult to believe that the latter would remain a viable alternative.
Thus, in summary, it appears that a return to, or reaffirmation of, the prin-
ciples of finality of property divisions, integrated agreements, and the effects of
reconciliation on executory portions of settlement agreements would serve well
the interests of the state, the parties, and the practicing bar. Walters, and to a
lesser degree Small and Tucci, for too long have led domestic law in this state
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toward results that are bewilderingly complex, and fundamentally unsound, at
practical, policy, and analytical levels.
